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Introduction 
Pop Culture Déjà vu  
 When I lived in Beijing for three years in the mid 1990s I would often 
find myself scratching my head.  That head-scratching continued throughout 
the two subsequent years I lived in Guangzhou after moving from Beijing.  I 
was seeing things that did not fit with my idea of China; things that reminded 
me of movies I had seen of China in the 1920s and 1930s.  The things I saw 
harkened back to a time of gangsters, lounge singers, playboys and party 
girls, conspicuous consumption, and moral ambiguity.   The urban culture of 
late twentieth century China, in many ways, looked to me like an updated 
version of the urban culture I had imagined of 1920s and 1930s China – 
rapidly-changing, intriguing, and decidedly unlike the China I first encountered 
in the 1980s. 
 There was a saying going around Beijing when I lived there that was a 
play on the old saying “Anyone who has not climbed the Great Wall is not a 
real Chinese,” that stated, “Any man who does not have 10 mistresses is not 
a real man.”  I would often see some middle-aged or elderly unremarkable-
looking man with two or three young beautiful women hanging on his arms 
while getting out of his Mercedes Benz in front of a shopping center.  They 
would be hanging on his every word, seemingly enraptured by whatever he 
had to say or expectantly waiting for the next thing he would propose.  I would 
hear friends of mine say that they knew of female classmates in their 
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graduate programs who were looking for a “sugar daddy” to take help fund 
the type of lifestyle they wanted to lead.  While a foreign student in Beijing, I 
was propositioned by a Chinese man (the coworker of my friend’s husband) 
to be his mistress… right in front of his wife.  These instances only fueled my 
interest in that earlier period of Chinese history and any connections it had 
with what I was observing.  Little did I realize then that the thoughts that had 
begun to swirl around in my head would eventually become the basis for this 
thesis.  On closer inspection, it became clear that there was a phenomenon 
occurring in what I will herein refer to as the post Mao era (dating from 1976 
to the present) that had already occurred in urban China during the 
Republican era (dating from 1911 to roughly 1945).  That phenomenon is the 
emergence and development of a spontaneous urban popular culture. 
Anyone who visits Beijing, Shanghai, or other large urban centers in 
China today will see a cultural landscape that looks incredibly different from 
the one they would have witnessed just twenty years ago.  Larger-than-life 
billboard advertisements of scantily-clad buxom women selling Wonder bras, 
colorful throngs of fashionably-dressed urbanites jostling for position on 
congested sidewalks, and a rainbow of neon lights advertising anything from 
discos to delicatessens line the boulevards of these cities.  Snatches of 
conversation might reveal enticing speculation on the newest Chinese soap 
opera, the latest news on the love life of a Chinese rock star or actress, or 
how to obtain the latest underground sexposé novel. 
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Figure 1 
Hanging lingerie advertisement in China World Trade Shopping Center – Beijing, 20061
Contrast those images with the mid-eighties snapshots of China taken 
by visitors to the People’s Republic in the early years of economic reform.  
Those descriptions conjure up images of drone-like crowds of Chinese 
laborers marching to and fro like ants in their nondescript gray and blue Mao 
suits.2  Twenty years ago a visitor to Beijing would be lucky to hear anything 
on the radio other than the voice of a revolutionary comrade barking out 
calisthenics commands to a background of martial music, or the latest news 
according to the Chinese Communist Party.  Conversations overheard on the 
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street would be peppered with talk of new policies sent down from the central 
government and how they were presented in the latest political study session. 
 Indeed, China’s urban cultural landscape has changed radically since 
the end of the Cultural Revolution, and at an exponentially increasing rate 
since the early 1990s.  That urban cultural landscape is characterized by 
cultural innovation, the commodification of culture, a renegade attitude toward 
culture, and the manifestation of culture creation from the bottom up.  While 
all four of those characteristics of spontaneous urban pop culture 
development were also apparent during the Republican era, they were sorely 
lacking during the pop culture wasteland of the Maoist era.  That is not to say 
that there was no urban popular culture during that time, but that the urban 
pop culture of the Maoist era was one that was highly orchestrated and 
controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and the State, and was not 
spontaneous in its overall nature like the urban pop cultures of the post Mao 
and Republican eras. 
In today’s China, culture has even become an industry that has been 
packaged for consumer consumption.  One such occurrence of culture 
becoming commodity appeared in the early 1990s, and illustrates how even 
political icons have become commodities of popular culture.  Virtually 
overnight in early 1990, taxi drivers in Beijing and Shanghai started hanging 
large gold medallions, with the likeness of Mao Zedong carved in gold relief, 
from their rearview mirrors like good luck charms.  Some medallions were 
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featured Mao’s face on one side and the face of Zhou Enlai on the other.  
One telling conversation about what those medallions may have meant to 
some of the people who displayed them is found in the autobiography of 
outspoken Chinese actress Liu Xiaoqing, I Did It My Way (Wode lu).  In 1992 
she spent the Spring Festival holiday in Shenzhen.  She recounts her 
experience in this way:  “During the holiday I happened to take taxis a number 
of times.  None of the taxis had the usual talismans for good fortune hanging 
from their rear-view mirrors.  What hung there instead was Chairman Mao’s 
portrait.  I asked the drivers about it and they all said that they hung the 
Chairman because he could ward off evil.”3  In his book, Shades of Mao, 
Geremie Barmé likens the reemergence of the public’s fascination with Mao, 
what he calls the “Mao Cult,” to the cult of Elvis, “the King.”4  This quote from 
Greil Marcus’ book, Dead Elvis: A Chronicle of a Cultural Obsession, 
highlights those features that the cults of Mao and Elvis share: 
 
When he died, the event was a kind of explosion that 
went off silently, in minds and hearts; out of that explosion came 
many fragments, edging slowly into the light, taking shape, 
changing shape again and again as the years went on.  No one, 
I think, could have predicted the ubiquity, the playfulness, the 
perversity, the terror, and the fun of this, of Elvis Presley’s 
second life:  a great, common conversation, sometimes, a 
conversation between specters and fans, made out of songs, art 
works, books, movies, dreams… In either form it was – is – a 
story that needed no authoritative voice, no narrator, a story that 
flourishes precisely because it is free of any such thing, a story 
that told itself.5 
 
 10 
Not only did the medallions appear, but also a variety of “Mao 
sportswear” – tee shirts, sweatshirts and canvas bags with a silk-screen of 
Mao’s profile or with the words “serve the people” (wei renmin fuwu) – was 
available for purchase in the street markets of Beijing.  The availability of such 
items of pop nostalgia speaks to the resourcefulness of China’s youth culture 
industry in capitalizing on the Mao Cult’s popularity with the new “teeny-
bopper” market.  Many of the people consuming Mao products were people 
who were unfamiliar with the Maoist era – adolescents and people in their 
early twenties. 6  How strange, and profitable, that a man who was once the 
supreme political icon of socialist China experienced a resurgence of 
popularity, resurfacing as an icon of popular culture.  Mao’s currency as a pop 
culture icon is just as apparent today as it was back in the early 90s.  
 
Figure 2 
Canvas Mao handbag purchased from street vendor on Wangfujing – Beijng, 
2006 
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Figure 3 
Lei Feng t-shirt purchased from street vendor on Wangfujing – Beijing, 2006 
 
A more recent occurrence of political nostalgia turned cultural 
commodity can be seen in the resurgence in the popularity of the People’s 
Liberation Army’s (PLA) most-beloved model soldier, Lei Feng.  His cool 
factor is such that his likeness is appearing not only on tee shirts sported by 
dancers in Beijing and Shanghai nightclubs, but it is also appearing on 
Chinese skateboards and in urban street graffiti.  One Chinese skateboard 
company has co-opted Lei Feng’s exhortation to, “serve the people” by 
naming their company The People’s Skateboards (Shehui) and using the 
words “serve the people” as their brand’s tag line.  The People’s Skateboards, 
based in Beijing, feature either a silhouette of Lei Feng in his winter PLA hat 
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(with flaps flying), or a revolutionary pose of workers and peasants laboring 
for the socialist good on the bottoms of their skateboard decks.7  Although the 
skateboarding community is not as large in China as it is in the States, per 
capita, The People’s Skateboards is doing a banner business and even has 
its own storefront in Beijing’s Chaoyang District.  
 
 
  
Figure 4     Figure 5 
Two of the founders of The People’s   Skateboard Shop – Beijing, 2006 
Skateboards – Beijing, 2006 
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  Figure 6 
  The People’s Skateboards’ best-selling Lei Feng deck 
 
According to Geremie Barmé, even dissent has become a commodity 
in China – one with its own niche-market.  
  “Underground art, novels, rock and roll and 
the ‘alternative’ film industry in China are all too 
aware of the appeal both at home and abroad of 
the Chinese rebel voice.  Dissidence has become 
a ‘genre’ (the ‘dissident label’), and a ‘packaged 
dissent’, which is commodified and sold like any 
other product.”8 
 
He goes on to point out that for such products to appeal to consumers of the 
dissident genre they must attract enough criticism from official censors to 
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qualify as ‘dissident’, but must still make it through the same censor’s office in 
such a way that there is still a product left to sell on the Chinese market.   
Another popular genre of cultural products is that of the urban 
alternative (linglei), or fringe culture – representing anyone who falls outside 
the mainstream, claims to fall outside the mainstream, or who is truly 
disenfranchised.9  Fringe culture in urban China today is cool, and it sells.  
Such a culture industry, according to Barmé, not only caters to the market, 
but also actually helps to produce that market by manufacturing a desire for 
such products.10 
Not only has Chinese culture been changing radically, but the social 
changes that accompany this cultural change are also more and more evident 
to China’s leaders and the Chinese public.  Officials are increasingly 
embarrassed by figures showing that the phenomenon of sexual promiscuity 
among young urban Chinese is widespread and on the rise.11  As a result, 
there has been an increase in the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, 
the number of unmarried Chinese women using birth control, and the number 
of pregnancies among single women.12  Drug use and alcoholism, addictions 
that had all but disappeared during the Maoist era, are increasing at alarming 
rates.13  Whether these social changes are fueling the trends in pop culture 
development more than the development of pop culture is fueling these social 
changes is unclear.  What is clear is that spontaneous urban popular culture 
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is alive and well today in China, and it is not the first incidence of such a 
phenomenon in modern Chinese history.   
 
Thesis 
Many writings on Chinese cultural development over the last twenty 
years have focused on the radical changes that have occurred on the 
mainland.  The bulk of those writings herald the novelty of these changes and 
what may be considered as a spontaneous emergence and development of 
an urban popular culture in China.  One sentiment that is common among a 
number of these writings is that China has ventured into virgin and 
unexplored territory – that this spontaneous emergence of urban pop culture 
is the first of its kind to occur in modern Chinese history.14  
I believe that the emergence and development of spontaneous urban 
popular culture in post Mao era China is the second occurrence of this 
phenomenon in modern Chinese history.  The conditions that made China 
ripe for spontaneous urban pop culture development, the main messages 
expressed through urban popular culture, and the identity types celebrated 
through the urban popular culture of the Republican and post Mao eras, while 
not identical in appearance, are strikingly similar, representing two sides of 
the same coin.  In order to develop this assertion more fully, this thesis 
examines three of the primary features of the urban pop culture of each era 
that are similar.  First, this thesis examines the context of sociopolitical 
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conditions present during both eras that made China ripe for the emergence 
of spontaneous urban pop culture.  Second is the examination of the similar 
messages conveyed through the urban popular cultures of both eras that 
focus on the theme of identity – exploring the similarities between identity 
messages about individualism and cosmopolitanism.   Third, this thesis then 
examines the similar identity types (which could be called stereotypes) 
presented and celebrated through the urban pop culture of both eras.  The 
assertion of this thesis is that these three factors are similar enough in the 
popular cultures of both eras as to suggest that they represent the emergence 
of the same type of phenomenon.  Why these three similar factors exist at two 
separate periods of Chinese history, while fascinating, is not the major 
concern of this thesis.  The mere fact that they exist, and that they are so 
similar, is. 
  
Key Terms and Definitions 
 
Before outlining the thesis in more detail, the definition of popular 
culture and other key terms must be addressed.  Equally important are those 
issues and concepts that are naturally related to this topic, yet fall outside the 
scope of this thesis.   
Popular culture, for the purpose of this thesis, refers to “culture which 
originates from the people,” or mass culture.15  It is not a culture that is 
imposed from above, but is the authentic spontaneous culture of the people.16  
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This definition coincides with the idea of the spontaneous nature of pop 
culture development – that it occurs and thrives without the deliberate 
orchestrations or calculated machinations of the state or any other person or 
group who has authority over the people.17  This spontaneous pop culture 
development is both bottom-up, from a grassroots level, and top-down, with 
the top consisting of culture elites, those non elites who have the capital to 
fund their pop culture ventures, and various culture companies (which may be 
working in accordance with the regulations of the state, but not for the state),.  
It is not planned, prompted, or contrived by the state.  The primary force that 
shapes or steers the course of its development is the people (not the state), 
and those who create and participate in it do so voluntarily.  It is the people, 
and not solely their government, beginning to tell their own stories and the 
story of China, and packaging it for consumption. 
The geographical context of this paper is China, by which I am 
referring not to greater China or a China that includes Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Macao, but mainland China.  I also clearly refer to urban China, 
specifically, the major metropolitan areas of China with a population of at 
least one million people.  However, practical considerations make it 
necessary to limit my detailed focus to the urban pop cultures of Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou.  While these three cities do not provide the 
definitive view of urban pop culture throughout China, they are generally 
representative of the overall pop culture scene in most of urban China. 
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The term urban Chinese (or Chinese urbanites) refers to those who 
live in these metropolitan areas, and has a different meaning for each of the 
time periods covered in the paper.  For the Republican era, this term refers 
mostly to urban elites – intellectuals and those people whose social status 
had been elevated or determined by education, wealth or social status.  It 
also refers to those considered “petty urbanites” (xiao shimin) – “literate clerks 
and apprentices in trade, manufacturing, the professions, and public and 
private sectors, who were members of the “old” as well as the “new” middle 
classes.”18  For the post Mao era, the term urbanite simply refers to those 
Chinese who reside in metropolitan areas on a permanent or near-permanent 
basis.  
We must also consider the vehicles of pop culture.  A vehicle of pop 
culture, as used in this thesis, is the means by which a culture-maker 
transmits their message to the public forum.  The vehicles of pop culture 
expression generally fall into three broad categories – the arts, the media, 
and the popular press.  The venues and urban spaces that have grown up 
around each vehicle, and the people who occupied and utilized those spaces, 
became a means of transmitting popular culture to the urban public as well.  
The arts refer to literature, music, theatre, film, language, etc.  Media would 
include television, radio, advertising, and the Internet, to give a partial list.  
The popular press refers to magazines, newspapers, and online versions of 
both.  There is one other vehicle of pop culture expression that does not fall 
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under any of the broad categories just mentioned, and that is the vehicle of a 
unique individual’s life.  By that, I mean the actual day-to-day life of an 
individual in Chinese society who is of some notoriety.  The fact of their 
notoriety and the potential influence they have on those who observe their 
lives, makes them another vehicle of pop culture expression.  This thesis is by 
no means a comprehensive study of any one or all of these vehicles of pop 
culture expression, but a selection of representative items that are illustrative 
of the parallelism between the urban pop cultures of both eras.  
This thesis is not meant to be a comprehensive study of the urban pop 
cultures of both eras, but a look at representative examples from the popular 
cultures of each era that illustrate broad parallels between the two in the 
context, the messages on identity, and the celebrated identity types of urban 
popular culture.  It is not the intention of this thesis to prove that the urban 
pop cultures of both eras are identical, but to show that they are similar 
enough to be considered as two manifestations of the same phenomenon.   
Popular culture, especially in China, is a shifting terrain; a target that moves 
so quickly that its composition cannot be easily quantified.  Through this 
thesis I am attempting to identify parallel aspects of popular culture during two 
specific periods of time.  Indeed, because of the rapidly changing nature of 
Chinese urban pop culture I am confident that at the time this thesis is 
completed, certain aspects of my data will already be considered somewhat 
dated and timeworn.19 
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Design and Approach 
The central topic of this thesis shows two separate moments in modern 
Chinese history where similar though not identical manifestations of the same 
phenomenon materialized.  The kinship between the popular cultures of 
urban China during the Republican and post Mao eras are evidenced through 
the three primary factors of:  the contextual factors making China ripe for the 
emergence of spontaneous urban pop culture; the identity messages 
conveyed through urban pop culture; and the identity types celebrated 
through urban pop culture.  Chapter one outlines the similar sociopolitical 
conditions present in both eras that made China ripe for the emergence of 
spontaneous urban pop culture.  Chapters two and three address the similar 
messages on identity that are conveyed through the urban pop culture of both 
eras; chapter two deals with identity messages from both eras about 
individualism while chapter three deals with identity messages from both eras 
about cosmopolitanism.  Chapter four features the similar identity types 
presented and celebrated through the urban pop culture of both eras.  Each 
of these three chapters cites specific examples from the urban pop culture of 
both eras, providing excerpts from original works where possible.  Many of 
the examples I have used are ones that feature explicit sexual content.  The 
reason for this is twofold:  first, sex is extremely provocative – the pop culture 
examples that feature sexual content, and the type of sexual content they 
feature, draw attention to how different those pop culture works are from 
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those of the mainstream culture of the imperial era and the Maoist era; and 
second, sex is a powerfully tangible expression of individuality – an 
expression of individuality that had not been discussed so openly by so many 
people in each of the historical eras preceding the Republican and post Mao 
eras.   
An interesting contradiction emerged as I wrote chapters two, three, 
and four.  While culture makers of both eras were singing the praises of 
individuality and plurality, they also created many of their characters to 
conform to some degree to a preconceived “type” or recognizable 
demographic, thus reinforcing stereotypes (though they were new stereotypes) 
among those who consumed pop culture.  Could it be that the journey from 
being part of a conformist collective, through the celebration of one’s unique 
individuality eventually leads to a place where one understands what she 
values and desires, and as a result, is better-equipped to connect with others 
of similar values and desires?  I do not know if pop culture makers intended to 
identify their characters with a recognizable demographic at the time they 
created them, or if it was an inadvertent consequence of creating characters 
based on real life experiences, but I will address this contradiction a bit more 
in chapter four when I discuss the identity types that appear most often in the 
pop culture of both eras.  Lastly, chapter five is a summary of the most 
obvious ways in which the urban pop culture of the post Mao era parallels the 
urban pop culture of the Republican era and the significance of such parallels.   
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Before examining specific pop culture examples from both eras, we 
must examine the context in which urban pop culture emerged in both eras.  
Chapter one lays out that context by examining four sociopolitical factors that 
contributed to preparing the cultural soil that made both eras ripe for the 
emergence and development of spontaneous urban popular culture – a major 
shift in the locus of moral authority and social control, technological advances, 
rapid economic growth, and the influx of foreign influences.20 
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The period of Chinese history from 1949 to 1976 was one of dramatic change for 
Chinese culture and the Chinese people.  It is not the claim of this thesis that popular culture 
did not exist during that period, but that it was primarily a popular culture that resulted from 
the deliberate orchestrations and calculated machinations of the state for the purpose of 
furthering the mass political campaigns that characterized life in Maoist China.   
Whatever spontaneous popular culture existed during that period did not contain the 
four components mentioned above.  The mass culture of the period could not be deemed 
spontaneous popular culture under the terms presented above, and existed purely under the 
controlling thumb of the Party bureaucracy.  While popular culture during the Maoist era is a 
fascinating subject, it falls outside the scope of this thesis, and thus, is only mentioned 
incidentally. 
20 While whole chapters could be devoted to each of these factors, a brief overview of each is 
provided solely for the purpose of context.  A full treatment of each or all of these factors falls 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
Context for Cultural Change 
 
The examination of the popular cultures of urban China during the 
Republican and post Mao eras must begin by noting the obvious contrast 
between the popular culture of these two periods and the cultural systems 
that prevailed throughout China during the historical period that immediately 
preceded each.  While different in substance, the mass cultures of the late 
imperial era and the Maoist era were established and predicated upon the 
same two principles – the homogeneity and superiority of Chinese culture and 
of the Chinese people.  Homogeneity was based on the ideal that all Chinese 
were culturally the same and valued the same things in life as their leaders.  
Theoretically, they would live their lives in strict accordance with one set of 
values – resulting in a very top-down management of society and, hence, 
order.  Embedded within that concept was the conviction that the Chinese 
people were not only a homogeneous people, but also a unique people who 
had nothing significant in common with anyone or anything outside of their 
culture (in the imperial era) or country (in the Maoist era), and were obviously 
superior people with a superior culture.  During the imperial era, the best 
illustration of this principle is found in the word most commonly used to 
denote a non-Chinese person – foreign devil (yang guizi).  During the Maoist 
era, the Chinese people were told by their leaders that their superiority was 
not only cultural, but also political.  This belief was at the heart of the basic 
 26 
distrust of foreigners and all things non-Chinese.  Even socialism was 
Sinicized by China’s political leaders.   
Because of the economic, technological, political and social changes 
that fed the development of mass popular culture in urban China during the 
Republican and post Mao eras, these two bedrocks of Chinese culture, 
homogeneity and superiority, began to crumble under the sheer plurality of 
ideas that rushed in and the resulting identification of more and more Chinese 
with the lives and concerns of those living in the non-Chinese world.  It also 
resulted in the creation and feeding of a desire within the hearts of many 
urban Chinese – a desire to test the limits within which life had been lived in 
China, and to possibly expand or even erase the borders within which that life 
had been lived.  
There had been a thin stream of the type of spontaneous urban 
popular culture that this thesis explores trickling into Chinese society during 
the late Qing Dynasty, as well as during the late years of the Cultural 
Revolution.  Once the Republic of China was established in 1911, and the 
economic reform policies of 1978 were begun in earnest, that stream began 
to swell, quickly growing into a river.  With the impetus of the student 
movements of May 4, 1919 and June 4, 1989, respectively, that popular 
culture river began to widen and rage, cutting indelibly through the Chinese 
urban landscape. 
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The emergence and development of popular culture in urban China 
during the Republican and post Mao eras represented and still represents a 
new forum for spontaneous public exploration and expression.  That public 
exploration and expression extended to sharing new ideas, opinions, and 
ways of life, to wrestling in a public forum with questions of both an individual 
and collective nature, and to offering an alternate venue for didactic discourse.  
Such an opportunity was especially welcome, at least by some, after an 
extended period of personal or collective censure imposed by Confucian 
traditionalism or Maoist extremism. 
In order to understand why urban pop culture emerged in Republican 
and post Mao China, we must also examine the context within which and from 
which Chinese urban pop culture began to thrive.  The remainder of this 
chapter will paint the larger picture of how this phenomenon occurred by 
demonstrating the common chronological pattern for urban pop culture 
development, and by highlighting the context in which four primary 
sociopolitical factors made China ripe for urban pop cultural development in 
both eras.   
 
The Ripening of Republican China 
The first wave of the chronological pattern through which spontaneous 
urban pop culture emerged began with one of the first significant political 
shifts in twentieth century China – the end of the Chinese imperial system and 
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the founding of the Republic of China (ROC) on October 10, 19111  For the 
first time in modern history China willingly opened its doors wide, and began 
the process of assuming its place upon the world stage.  The political 
revolution also swept a cultural revolution into China that came to pursue as 
its mission the replacement of traditional Confucian culture.  That movement, 
appropriately named the New Culture Movement, started as a discourse on 
whether or not those aspects of Confucian culture that had not been 
supplanted by republicanism and nationalism needed to be salvaged to 
maintain stability.  The early years of the New Culture Movement were 
marked by extensive debate on the evils or benefits of Confucian culture 
(namely, ethics), but as the movement continued to gain momentum, 
especially with the impetus of the May Fourth Incident of 1919, those who 
favored a wholesale destruction of Confucian culture and its influence in the 
daily life of the Chinese people won out and dominated the discourse.2 
Less than a decade after the founding of the Republic of China, public 
student-led protests erupted in Beijing, Shanghai, and other major Chinese 
cities on May 4, 1919, which came to be known as the May Fourth Incident.  
Chinese students responded to their government’s capitulation to the unfair 
terms of the Versailles Agreement reached by the Allies at the end of World 
War One, and took to the streets to demonstrate.  The students called for five 
resolutions, the most immediate of which called on their government to reject 
the terms of Versailles that allowed Japan to acquire those concessions on 
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the Chinese mainland formerly held by Germany.  The students also called 
for Chinese citizens to make their antipathy known by joining the 
demonstrations and by boycotting foreign-made goods, especially those from 
Japan.  The demonstrations lasted for only one day, but several violent 
clashes occurred with police, resulting in injuries on both sides and the death 
of one student.  By the evening of May 4th, most of those involved in the 
demonstrations had dispersed.  Those who remained in the streets were 
arrested.3 
Even though the demonstrations of May Fourth ended the same day 
they began, they succeeded, in part, by capturing the attention and 
imagination of many urban Chinese.  Another of the five resolutions was a call 
to “awaken the masses all over the country to an awareness of China’s 
plight.”  The May Fourth demonstrations and the recognition of China’s plight 
touched a nerve of collective discontent4 that had already existed but had yet 
to be openly acknowledged among a large number of Chinese urbanites.  At 
the same time, the demonstrations also expressed a collective sense of hope 
for a better China.  In the wake of those demonstrations and the optimistic 
discontent that they revealed, a revolution that changed the cultural 
landscape of society and daily life began to spread throughout urban China.  
That cultural revolution, the May Fourth Movement (as part of the greater 
New Culture Movement), was the impetus of the first wave of spontaneous 
urban pop culture development in modern China. 5   
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After the establishment of the ROC in 1911, the modernization and 
industrialization of the country was the critical order of business.  The spirit of 
the May Fourth Movement was evident in the enthusiasm with which China’s 
intellectuals embraced Western education models and the western concepts 
of nationalism and individualism.  Western educational models appealed to 
China’s intellectuals due to its emphasis on the study of science and 
mathematics, and the hope that both would provide key components to 
modernization and industrialization.  For many urban intellectuals nationalism 
became the skeleton upon which they would flesh out this new social 
experiment of building a modern and self-reliant nation full of self-reliant 
citizens.6 
The hunger for progress and cultural liberation for the individual as well 
as society, and the collective need for a previously repressed public for open 
discourse and personal expression, fueled the desire to create an 
atmosphere where experimentation and discovery were encouraged.  In such 
an atmosphere the flow of ideas would be freer and less impeded by the rigid 
social and moral constraints of traditional Chinese culture.  Those hungers 
and desires, along with the embryonic formation of a public consciousness of 
citizenship, nationalism and globalization, combined forcefully to change the 
very mindset of urban Chinese and the context in which they lived.   The 
following section examines the context in which spontaneous urban popular 
culture emerged.  Four of the sociopolitical factors that contributed to 
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preparing the cultural soil that made Republican era China ripe for 
spontaneous urban pop culture emergence and development are a major shift 
in the locus of moral authority and social control, technological advances, 
rapid economic growth, and the influx of foreign influences.7 
 
Shift in the Locus of Moral Authority and Social Control 
Chinese culture and society experienced dramatic shifts in the early 
years of the Republican era that fundamentally altered the daily life of large 
numbers of Chinese citizens; urbanites in particular.  In each case these 
shifts represented a partial dissolution of the conventions that had previously 
governed the course and activities of everyday life.  These shifts began to 
reshape the structure and institutions of daily life and called into question the 
moral authority of the dominant Confucian culture. The dramatic moral and 
societal shift that marked the periods immediately prior to and during the 
Republican era was more than two thousand years in the making.  Several 
small cries for change were made in the late years of the Qing and in the 
early years of the Republic, but the May Fourth Movement, and the even 
larger New Culture Movement that encompassed it, called for modernization 
and widespread change in Chinese culture on a monumental scale.  Its 
anthem was a call for nothing less than the de-Confucianization of Chinese 
culture and society, and a shift of the locus of moral authority and social 
control away from Confucianism and traditional Chinese values. 8 
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Confucian philosophy had been the moral and social barometer of 
Chinese life for centuries.  The hierarchy of authority and relationships, 
private thought, social propriety, and public ceremony were all governed by a 
narrow code of conduct, which provided the proper and appropriate response 
to any given situation.9  During the Republican era, particularly after the onset 
of the May Fourth Movement, Confucianism’s monopoly on moral authority 
was openly called into question.  The May Fourth Movement, as part of the 
broader New Culture Movement, is described as a multi-pronged attack on 
“everything from China’s past that had smothered progress and creativity” – 
an attack on “tradition for the sake of tradition.”  Urban intellectuals and 
students constituted the main foot soldiers of this new cultural movement.  
Their hope was to take the best aspects of Chinese culture and blend them 
with the best of Western science, Western education and Western values.  
Those aspects of Chinese culture that were most oppressive to individual 
exploration, expression, and progress, were likewise considered oppressive 
to the progress of the nation.  Hence, there was a need to replace Confucian 
values with more liberal (i.e. modern) values that would not strangle or 
impede the progress of the individual or the nation.10 
How did China’s urban elites go about shifting the locus of moral 
authority and social control away from Confucianism?  They challenged 
Confucianism in three main spheres of life.  The first sphere was that of 
traditional values.  The second sphere was one of the cornerstones of 
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Confucian social hierarchy, the position and inaccessibility of the scholarly 
elite.  The third sphere included the institutions of marriage and the family. 
First, China’s urban elite challenged the sphere of traditional values by 
calling for people to reject such values and replace them with a new 
philosophy of life.  China would best be served, the urban elite maintained, by 
encouraging its citizens to explore and express their best hopes for personal 
progress and the progress of the country, and giving them the corresponding 
freedom to do so, outside the narrow confines of Confucian values.11  
However, the question of what would replace the moral authority of 
Confucianism created a moral and ethical vacuum for those Chinese who 
embraced the “new culture.”  If Confucianism and traditional values were no 
longer to be trusted, then what values would provide the best standard for 
moral decision-making?  Individuals were exhorted to choose for themselves 
the values upon which they would base their decisions from the large variety 
of competing ideas in the arena of public discourse.12 
Second, China’s urban elite sought to eradicate the Confucian notion 
of the scholar elite by bringing Chinese intellectuals into closer contact and 
association with average Chinese through a literary revolution.  The central 
principle of the literary revolution was a change in the language of literature 
from classical Chinese to the vernacular, or baihua.  That one change made 
literature and various forms of the popular press that were previously 
inaccessible to the average Chinese, more available.  In 1920 the Ministry of 
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Education in Beijing decreed that baihua would be the language taught in 
public schools, and by the 1930s almost all writing was in some form of 
baihua.13 
Third, urban intellectuals further challenged the formality and rigidity of 
Confucianism by rejecting Confucian social conventions and the Confucian 
family structure.14   For those who made that change, a whole world of 
possibilities opened before them.  Social conventions that once prohibited 
close associations between people of different classes or different genders no 
longer governed the interactions of daily life.  Because of the greater freedom 
of boys, girls, men and women to associate with whom they chose, two 
institutions in China were changed indelibly – education and marriage.  
Coeducational schools, which offered the same learning opportunities to 
women as to men, began to appear on the urban Chinese landscape.  
Probably even more revolutionary was the concept of free love, which allowed 
for individuals to choose for themselves whom to marry, if indeed they chose 
to marry at all, and the establishment of a nuclear family residence, apart 
from the extended family.15 
 
Technological Advances 
 Several technological advances occurred during the late years of the 
Qing and during the Republican era that contributed to and accelerated the 
development of urban popular culture through the dissemination of new ideas 
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and products.  One of the primary technological advances was the 
mechanization of the printing press.  This one innovation led to the 
burgeoning of print capitalism and the modern press in China. 16   
Foreign-trained Chinese intelligentsia founded literally hundreds of 
magazines devoted to introducing Western culture and thought, and within six 
months of the May Fourth Incident there were already over four hundred new 
periodicals on the scene, all written in the vernacular. 17  China’s modern 
press provided a public forum for the discussion of national, social, and 
intellectual concerns.  Translations of books (both fiction and non-fiction), 
newspapers, and other periodicals from Western languages also became a 
major industry. 18  
The invention of photography and its adoption by modern magazines 
and newspapers only fueled public interest in the written words 
accompanying photos in Chinese periodicals.19  The availability of radio and 
the talking film made news and entertainment more accessible to the public – 
even the illiterate urban public.  An entire industry developed around the 
production and distribution of sound movies, necessitating the building of 
theatres and creating a market for the ever-popular movie magazine and 
movie memorabilia.20 
Finally, technological advances in transportation expanded the markets 
new goods and information could reach, considerably cutting down the 
distribution time for both.  The arrival of the automobile in China, and the 
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continued expansion of the railway system facilitated the greater mobility of 
people, products, and information.21 
 
Rapid Economic Growth 
The Republican era also experienced rapid economic growth, which 
became a foundational component in the development of urban popular 
culture.  The initial stimulus of economic growth was the global increase in the 
price of goods and raw materials created by World War One.  Chinese 
entrepreneurs took advantage of the preoccupation of European businesses 
with the war, and soon replaced many European goods and services with 
their own in the Chinese market.  As a result of this opportunity and a change 
in Chinese attitudes toward the merchant class and the open pursuit of 
economic gain, which were previously acknowledged with disdain, a 
successful Chinese business class began to emerge between 1911 and 1937.  
Not only did a business class emerge in China, but a growing middle class 
also began to emerge in urban China.22   
As culture became more commodified, it also became a more 
attractive investment, which encouraged the growth of several culture 
industries – the printing and publishing industries, and the entertainment 
industry, especially the movie industry.  As a result of the success of print 
capitalism, large numbers of literary societies, journals, newspapers, & 
publishing companies sprang up and formed the necessary background of a 
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phenomenon generally known as wentan, or the literary scene, and more 
entertainment venues began to dot the urban landscape, such as dance halls, 
movie theaters, and coffee houses.23  The advertising industry also grew… 
 
Influx of Foreign Influences 
 Another factor that made the emergence and growth of urban popular 
culture possible, was the massive influx of foreign influence into Chinese 
society during the Republican era, and especially after the May Fourth 
Incident in 1919.  This influx occurred as China was emerging from self-
imposed isolation from the outside world that was sacrosanct during the Qing 
Dynasty.   
The rapid incursion of Western thought and culture added even more raw 
material to fuel the public intellectual and philosophical disputes in the years 
immediately following the May Fourth Incident of 1919.  The greater 
availability of foreign literature translated into Chinese and the attention the 
Chinese urban elite gave to Western ideas made this possible.24  A new “May 
Fourth” vocabulary sprang up overnight with the introduction of several 
foreign “isms” into the Chinese lexicon – nationalism, universalism, Marxism, 
humanism, feminism, etc. to name just a few.  One of the most foreign of 
these isms, however, was individualism.  Individualism, and the liberation of 
the individual, became one of the dominant themes of the May Fourth 
Movement.25 
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Three different yet interrelated strands of experimentalism were 
introduced during the Republican era – scientific experimentalism, 
philosophical experimentalism, and literary experimentalism.  Lu Xun was a 
big proponent of literary experimentalism, and took an iconoclastic stance in 
the valorization of all things new.26   His example (and the example of others 
like him) captured the attention and admiration of numerous young men and 
women.  Attracted by the lifestyle and the popularity of the works of Lu Xun 
and other vocational literati, more people than ever before began to look at 
literature as a vocation, and sought to make that their life ambition.27  
Western educational and management methods, the introduction of 
“Mr. Science” and “Mr. Democracy” to the Chinese mindset, and the 
promotion of Western social customs forever changed interaction between 
urban Chinese men and women.  By adopting the Western attitude toward 
“free love”, as opposed to succumbing to a marriage arranged by the family 
patriarch, urban men and women in Republican China experienced greater 
social freedom in their interactions with one another.  Greater economic 
opportunity also allowed for greater social mobility, especially of urban 
women, and began to break the hold traditional notions of class-
consciousness had formerly had on social intercourse.28  One other foreign 
influence that made the emergence of urban popular culture in China possible 
was the inspiration provided by Japan’s economic and social transformation 
during the Meiji Restoration period (1868).  Japan was one Asian country that 
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had “westernized” successfully, and was a reminder of the possibilities that 
could be achieved through modernization and the resulting cultural 
transformation it brought.29  As a result of Japan’s example, and the example 
of modernized Western countries, Chinese students began to leave in droves 
for university campuses abroad.  Many not only brought their degrees back to 
China, but also their modern sensibilities of life in Japan and the West.30 
The four sociopolitical factors outlined above are by no means 
comprehensive, but their contribution to making Republican era China ripe for 
the emergence and development of a spontaneous urban popular culture is 
an obvious one.  The following section illustrates how these same factors 
contributed to making China in the post Mao era ripe for a similar (though not 
identical) emergence and development of spontaneous urban popular culture. 
 
The Ripening of Post Mao China 
The chronological pattern of urban pop culture development displayed 
in the Republican era is paralleled in a similar pattern in the post Mao era.  
The second wave of this chronological pattern began with the dramatic 
political shift that occurred with the end of the Cultural Revolution.  In 1976 
the Chinese government was in a relative state of uncertainty.  The country 
was reeling from the deaths of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and from the 
arrest and trial of the “Gang of Four”.  Deng Xiaoping and his pro reform 
supporters spent their first few years in power maneuvering to stay there.  
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Rapid economic growth threatened to outstrip the government’s ability to 
harness it, and the central government of the PRC was, therefore, 
preoccupied with the immense undertaking of moving the country forward on 
the road to progress – so much so that functions of social and political control 
received much less attention than during the Maoist years.   
Optimism for political change had been building slowly along with the 
economic changes of the 1980s.  Indeed, since the economic reforms began 
in 1978, such political optimism occasionally reared its embarrassing head in 
the form of democracy wall posters and small-scale demonstrations.31  The 
fullness of this optimism was expressed in the spring of 1989, when students 
took to the streets of Beijing demanding a dialogue with Party leaders on 
issues ranging from official corruption to a call for democratic elections for 
government positions.32  The suppression of the student demonstrations on 
June 4, however, squelched the frenetic optimism exhibited throughout urban 
China during those short six and a half weeks of “Beijing Spring.”  Slowly, as 
China began to recover from the surreal events of the spring and early 
summer of 1989, the hope for political change was supplanted by a 
resignation among many of China’s urbanites that was distinctly apolitical in 
nature, and focused on a more self-serving approach to life. If political change 
could not be affected through collective effort, then an individual could at least 
concentrate on serving his own interests, and those of his family.  The public 
expression of that resignation was the primary impetus that amplified and 
 41 
advanced the development of spontaneous urban pop culture during the post 
Mao era. 
The following section will examine the same four sociopolitical factors 
that contributed to the emergence and development of a spontaneous urban 
popular culture in the Republican era, as they are manifest in the post Mao 
era.  The four factors are a major shift in the locus of moral authority and 
social control, technological advances, rapid economic growth, and the influx 
of foreign influences. 
 
Shift in the Locus of Moral Authority and Social Control 
The major moral and societal shift that marked the period dating from 
the beginning of the economic reforms instituted in 1978 to the present is one 
that required a clear-cut departure from thirty years of Maoist ideology.  The 
intent of the reforms of the Chinese Communist Party was to decentralize 
state control of the economy in order to stimulate and fuel economic growth.33  
Up to that point the barometer for moral and social control among the 
Chinese people had been the Party and its interpretation of Maoist ideology; 
implemented and overseen by the Party’s watchdog – the work unit.  
Ironically, one of the most compelling effects of the reforms was a significant 
de-politicization of daily life for the average Chinese which shifted the locus of 
moral authority and social control away from the Party, and hence, away from 
the work unit.  This de-politicization occurred for a number of reasons, the 
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chief of which was the weakening of the basic structure of political control – 
the work unit, or danwei – through decentralization.  Since the founding of the 
People’s Republic, every urban Chinese was registered as a member of the 
unit with which he or she worked.34  The work unit’s party leaders exercised 
tremendous power and control over the lives its members.  As managers and 
administrators of many of the social welfare benefits accorded to work unit 
members such as housing assignments, medical care, rudimentary education, 
allocation of food staples, and retirement benefits, their control was very real.  
Their approval was also required for a wide range of privileges – including 
those educational opportunities in addition to rudimentary education, 
permission to marry, permission to have a child, and travel (both domestic 
and foreign), to name some of the more obvious ones.35   
The housing assignments and living arrangements provided by the 
work unit to its members added a special and personal measure of control, 
due to the close physical proximity within which fellow work unit members 
lived.36  The work unit was also responsible for the political education of its 
members and their families.  Political directives or mass political campaigns 
that originated at the central government level passed directly through each 
respective bureaucratic level all the way down to the city or village level, 
finally ending with grass roots implementation at the work unit level.  Through 
a variety of work unit-sponsored activities and political study sessions, 
coupled with the close living conditions, compliance with the political and 
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social expectations set forth by the party was closely monitored.37  In a society 
where status was measured by political loyalty and the revolutionary nature of 
your class background, one’s political awareness and understanding of the 
nuances of political acceptance had to be finely tuned, in the interest of self-
preservation. 
Neighborhood committees were another tool that was employed for the 
informal gathering of information and monitoring of urban residents.  Those 
on the committee reported any unusual or suspicious activities, attitudes, or 
associations of work unit members to their superiors.  Any member of the 
work unit could report another member for “suspicions” of wrongdoing or 
wrong thought, and such people were often rewarded for their zeal.  All it 
would take to cause a problem for you was for someone to raise the question 
of your loyalty.38  As if your own ideological and political purity was not 
enough of a burden, it was expected that everyone would take responsibility 
for the ideological purity of those with whom they associated.  A common 
practice employed within work units was to pit coworkers against one another 
by exhorting them to be one another’s political conscience.  Not reporting 
those who deviated from political convention could even be considered as a 
counter-revolutionary crime, for “protecting an enemy of the people.”  
Practically every aspect of daily life had a political component associated to it, 
from your opinion about the mundane to your attitude toward work and your 
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coworkers.  Nothing was too small or insignificant to escape scrutiny, and 
dissociating oneself from political participation was not an option.39   
As a result of greater earning potential in the Chinese private sector 
and the economic instability of many state owned enterprises since the 
economic reforms began in 1978, the work unit has faltered as the key 
institution for social and political control in urban China.  The “iron rice bowl” 
of the state is no longer as strong as it once was, now that state-owned 
enterprises have to compete in the open market with private enterprises for 
their share of profits.40  Therefore the work unit no longer has the luxury to 
focus its energy on monitoring and controlling the daily lives of its members 
as it once did, especially as it relates to political education, and must instead 
focus on continuing to justify its existence through profits.  Many functions 
originally carried out by the work unit are no longer guaranteed by all work 
units, unless the work unit in question is an exceptionally profitable or 
essential one.41  Job placement for every urban Chinese, the allocation of 
housing, granting permission to marry, to have children, to travel, etc. – many 
of those responsibilities are falling into the hands of the individual in an 
increasing number of cases.  Those fortunate enough to have higher 
disposable incomes are also less reliant on a state-run work unit to provide 
for them.  As a result these people have greater freedom of movement 
geographically, and greater freedom of choice in daily life decisions.   Those 
with higher disposable incomes are able to purchase some greater measure 
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of privacy by purchasing a private space in which to live.  This is particularly 
important in terms of exploring one’s identity through one’s sexuality. 
 
Rapid Economic Growth  
Once economic reforms were instituted in 1978, the country gradually 
made a shift away from the state-planned and state-controlled economy that it 
had operated under since the founding of the PRC.  A policy of “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics” and the Four Modernizations guided the 
economic reforms.42  Socialism with Chinese characteristics became a 
convenient euphemism for encouraging small-scale capitalism, allowing the 
development of a free market economy in a socialist system, and relying on 
foreign investment and technology to achieve economic goals.  Specifically, 
the economic reforms encouraged non-exploitive small-scale 
entrepreneurship in cities and in the countryside.  Incentive programs were 
instituted in the countryside and industry sectors of the economy that 
rewarded workers for greater or more efficient production.  These reforms, 
coupled with an exponential increase in foreign investment, eventually led to 
the gradual privatization of some industry. For the first time in the history of 
the PRC the state was allowing the development of a bourgeois class, with 
more and more Chinese, especially urban Chinese, willing to xia hai (下海) or 
“throw themselves into the sea” of private business.43 
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The possibility to get rich through private business or to make a higher 
income by working for a privately owned Chinese enterprise or joint venture 
corporation was not without its risks.  Such employment opportunities 
provided the potential for greater earnings, but could not provide the social 
and job security provided by the “iron rice bowl” of the state owned work unit.  
Ironically, as more and more private companies and individual entrepreneurial 
ventures began to succeed, state owned enterprises were found deficient by 
comparison. Larger numbers of urban Chinese were finding their jobs in the 
traditional work unit to be more and more uncertain as an increasing number 
of state owned enterprises closed when no longer able to compete with 
private enterprises in the same industry.44  
Economic growth – coupled with changing attitudes toward capitalism, 
personal profit and entrepreneurship – provided the opportunity to accumulate 
both wealth and goods, evidenced by the emergence of a growing middle 
class in urban China.  As a result, there was disposable income to spend, 
capital available to invest, and demand to be created.  The market for cultural 
consumption grew out of capital investments in the work of professional 
culture makers (i.e. authors, artists, actors, musicians, etc.), and investments 
into the development of the myriad of cultural companies – wenhua gongsi, 
sprouting up all over China.45  As the market became flooded with new goods 
to consume, it tapped into an emotion, the public expression of which was 
previously suppressed during the Maoist years – desire.   
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Technological Advances 
When the economic reforms began in 1978, personal access to 
technology in China was extremely limited.  Since that time, television 
ownership has increased from ten million sets to more than almost ninety 
times as many. Not only that, but access to satellite and cable television is at 
an all-time high, and talk radio, unheard of in Maoist China, is increasingly 
popular as a forum for public discourse.  Personal communication in urban 
China today is as high-tech and rapid, if not more so, than in most cities in the 
United States.  In the late 1980s there were roughly 50,000 mobile phones in 
China, compared with almost 10 million today.  Computer literacy and usage 
is extremely high, and ownership of personal and home computers is rising.  
Nowhere, however, is the technological revolution in China more evident than 
in the use of the Internet.  While many have been closed during various 
political crackdowns of the 1990s, Internet cafes are still one of the most 
popular venues for young urbanites to gather and to exchange information.  
Practically everyone you meet in China’s cities has an email address.  
Microsoft China estimates that of the over 100 million users of Myspace® 
worldwide, 60 million of them are from mainland China,46 and more and more 
people are turning to the Internet for their news and personal information 
gathering.  Advances in urban mass transportation and highway infrastructure 
projects allow people and goods to travel more efficiently and quickly than 
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ever before.  Personally-owned automobiles are increasing exponentially in 
number, attesting to the rise in the standard of living of the middle class, and 
adding to the increasing freedom of movement in and between China’s urban 
centers (when not caught in the gridlock of urban traffic). 
These technological advances, along with the many others, have 
increased the ability of Chinese people to have a freer exchange of 
information with each other and with the world, often at split second speed.  In 
an age of increasing globalization, such technological advances help to 
expand the personal borders of the world (of information and people) within 
which the Chinese people live, while decreasing the distance (both practically 
and theoretically) between them and that world.  Such instant contact and the 
massive exchange of ideas are at the heart of the emergence of urban pop 
culture, and fuel the fire of its continued development. 
 
Influx of Foreign Influences 
The isolation from which China was emerging in 1978 was a self-
imposed isolation that had cut the PRC off almost completely from the 
Western world for nearly thirty years.47  The influx of Western culture and 
technology that came with economic openness was an inevitable evil in the 
eyes of the central government, and was seen as the price of economic 
growth.48 The Chinese people were bombarded with Western pop culture 
images that heralded such non-socialist values as individualism, 
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consumerism, and hedonism.  Foreign influence has played a crucial role in 
capturing the imagination of the Chinese people and illuminating the 
possibilities of what Chinese urban pop culture could become.  Such 
exposure began to generate a “cultural exuberance” of sorts among the 
Chinese people that exhibited itself through more and increasingly public 
displays of Western culture with Chinese characteristics.  For an excellent 
example of this one need only look to advertising in China, especially the 
mass advertising of television and billboards.  One can hardly help noticing 
the larger-than-life billboards of under-wear-clad young women in urban 
China’s shopping districts.  At first, such ads depicted exclusively white 
foreign women, but increasingly, the models for these ads are voluptuous 
Chinese women.49   
Two other foreign influences that have contributed greatly to the 
emergence and development of urban pop culture in post Mao China are very 
Western in orientation – the importance of the individual, and the concept of 
“cool.”  The needs, concerns and desires of the individual are a strong current 
in the discourse of urban pop culture, especially since the 1990s.  The 
individual as consumer – of products, ideas, and culture – is now almost as 
common a part of the urban mindset in China as here in the U.S.  The 
concept of cool is more ambiguous.  It belies definition.  It is an intangible 
quality that radiates individuality, innovation, newness, boldness, beauty or 
effortlessness.  Its main quality is the ability to stir desire for it in the hearts of 
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those who witness it.  The desire for “coolness,” to produce it and possess it, 
is one of the driving forces of urban pop culture. 
The foreign influences that have flowed into China since the economic 
door was flung open in 1978 are too numerous to provide an exhaustive 
listing here.  What is obvious, however, is that not only has China been 
influenced by Western culture, but it is also creating new forms of Chinese 
culture in light of foreign influences. 
The shift in the locus of moral authority and social control in daily life 
away from the Party in post Mao China is apparent in the unabashed hunger 
among many Chinese for a personal share in the economic opportunities 
created by the market reforms.  It is also apparent in the collective need of a 
formerly repressed public to explore greater opportunities for consumption, 
critical self-exploration, experimentation and personal expression.  This is 
only possible because of greater freedom from state monitoring and control, 
due to the decline in the work unit’s influence on daily life.  If all of this is 
coupled with rapid economic growth, the bombardment of China by foreign 
investment, culture, and values, and the sweeping technological changes of 
the last twenty years, then it is no surprise that urban popular culture is alive 
and thriving in China today.  
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Conclusion 
During the Republican and post Mao eras, China moved from 
extremely closed cultural systems which emphasized the same-ness and 
oneness of all Chinese people and the other-ness of all non-Chinese, to 
cultural systems that were more open and where people began to explore the 
differences among Chinese people, some of the ways in which Chinese 
people can identify with other (non-Chinese) people around the world, and 
ways in which Chinese people could identify with each other – ways formerly 
considered entirely too taboo to acknowledge or consider openly.  As Claire 
Huot states in her book, China’s New Cultural Scene, “The forced 
homogenization of the Maoist era has been replaced.  China is no longer one 
culture.”50  That same sentiment rang true during the Republican era.  As a 
result, China has witnessed two twentieth century shifts toward a more 
pluralistic society – a shift toward a society where the opportunity exists to 
choose between a variety of competing ideas and alternative ways of living 
and viewing the world.  Both shifts have been accompanied by a growing 
sense of universalism that has encouraged Chinese to view China and 
themselves as part of, and in light of, the global community.   
During the Republican and post Mao eras, culture makers tapped into 
urban China’s desire to break free from the straight-jacketing of Confucian 
traditionalism and Maoist socialism, respectively.  By breaking free individual 
Chinese had the opportunity to be the authors of their own stories and 
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contribute to the writing of the story of China, apart from the formal or official 
version of those stories.  Urban popular culture created a forum where the 
expression of years of suppressed Chinese experience, dreams, ideas, and 
private thoughts may happen, if not in a free environment, at least in a freer 
one.     
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Chapter 2 
Identity Messages on Individuality 
 
During the Republican and post Mao eras an incredible phenomenon 
emerged whereby many in the urban Chinese public abandoned the covered 
pot of homogeneous chicken broth Chinese culture in which they were 
floating (cooked up by Confucian traditionalism or Communist ideology) for 
the multi-flavored stew that is spontaneous urban popular culture.  Out of the 
diverse fusion of ingredients in that stew, the predominant one during both 
eras was that of individualism.   
China no longer looks or sounds like it did thirty years ago in the early 
stages of the post Mao era; the Chinese people look especially different.  If 
the progression of individual identity and its expression could be tracked in 
post Mao urban China solely by the style of dress worn by people on the 
street, an observer would have seen the blurry images of a mass of 
nondescript blue and gray figures of the late 1970s and 1980s come slowly 
into sharper focus as many of those people began to dress more uniquely 
and individually during the 1990s.  Today on the streets of urban China, an 
observer would see an ocean of colors, shapes, and styles.  These small 
gestures of individuality are a microcosm of a greater exercise of individual 
identity and autonomy by more and more Chinese.  In his book Streetlife 
China, Michael Dutton describes this phenomenon by declaring that the 
notion of the Chinese people continuing to be a “people-as-one” is a myth that 
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has been “blown wide open with a multiplicity of identities that have erupted 
across the urban Chinese landscape.”1  Style and color of dress is but the 
outer evidence of a more deeply personal awakening, one that had also 
occurred in China during the Republican era when urban popular culture 
celebrated and perpetuated some of these very distinct identities as they 
were erupting across the urban landscape.  It is as if Chinese urbanites 
during both of these periods finally began to admit what they really think and 
feel; no longer so afraid of the truth that it keeps them from acknowledging it.  
Sometimes the identity that a work of popular culture explores is not fictional, 
but is the actual identity of a notable Chinese culture maker. 
At the most basic level, identity is the way in which one defines oneself, 
and may refer in a superficial or substantial way to what typifies or 
characterizes them.  It is based on how one views, labels, or classifies those 
aspects of oneself to which one attributes importance – ones attitudes, values, 
talents, lifestyle, desires, pursuits, etc. 
Prior to the Republican era, a person’s gender and class were the two 
primary determinants of their identity.  According to Confucian tradition, a 
person was first a son or a daughter to his or her parents, and then they were 
a brother or sister to their siblings, honoring all who were their elders and 
ancestors.  A person paid homage to their family’s patriarch, and to those for 
whom their family worked.   If you were female, you also deferred to your 
male relatives until you were married to a suitable man who was chosen by 
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your family.  After marriage, a woman deferred to her husband’s family.  
Confucian codes of conduct and thought were the moral code for most 
Chinese, and questioning or going against that code set a person apart as a 
rebel; one who brought shame upon themselves and upon their family. 
Although measured by a different set of criteria, those who lived 
through the Maoist era also had their identities determined for them almost 
from birth.  The main determinants of identity during the Maoist era were 
class background and political purity.  It was assumed that all Chinese were 
supporters of ongoing political revolution, and that the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) was the moral standard-bearer for all aspects of thought and 
behavior.  To question the CCP was tantamount to questioning the revolution 
itself.  Those who did so ran the risk of being branded as a counter-
revolutionary and a traitor. 
With the advent of the Republican and post Mao eras, the possibility 
that identity was anything other than what had been inherited from one’s 
family or proscribed from above was a novel and captivating idea.  Individual 
identity became a topic of conversation that readily moved into the sphere of 
urban public discourse, and culture makers from both eras tapped into urban 
China’s desire to break free – either from the smothering confines of 
Confucian traditionalism, or the straight-jacketing of Maoist socialism – by 
placing experimentation and expression of individual identity as central 
themes in their works.  For the purpose of this thesis, the concept of identity 
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will be comprised of one or a combination of the following definitions:  “the 
essential character or aspect of a group or individual; the distinguishing 
character or personality of an individual or group; or the collective aspect of or 
set of characteristics by which a person is definitely recognizable or known.”2   
Anyone who would have visited Beijing, and especially Shanghai, in 
the first few years of the Republican era would have seen cities full of contrast 
– between the traditions of Confucian Chinese culture and the wildly 
variegated experimentations of modern Chinese urban culture.  A similar 
contrast has existed during the last thirty years of the post Mao era in urban 
China – where those who still hold to the ideals and the lifestyle once extolled 
by the socialist state stand in stark contrast to those people who are living a 
more consumer-driven and individual-oriented life.  The messages, the 
general principles, about individualism most commonly extolled by the urban 
popular cultures of both the Republican and post Mao eras are the subject of 
this chapter.  The specifics of these messages may vary from one era to the 
other, but the essential point of this chapter is the very fact that these similar 
messages are present in both eras.   
 Individualism is probably the most exotic and alien idea to hit the urban 
pop cultural stage in 20th Century China.  For a people who had been 
conditioned to believe in the importance of the collective over the individual, a 
theory that advocates the freedom, rights, and independent thought and 
action of each human being must have seemed shocking and potentially 
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liberating all at the same time.3  Pop culture messages on individualism in 
both the Republican and post Mao eras extolled and exemplified the 
uniqueness of each person, and encouraged individuals to live lives of 
autonomy, expression, and experimentation.  At the heart of all these 
messages was a celebration of individuality – the newfound freedom of 
independent thought and action, coupled with the equally new responsibility 
to determine one’s own personal moral standard, purpose, and direction in life.  
Leo Lee addresses this celebration of individuality during the Republican era 
in his book, The Romantic Generation of Modern Chinese Writers.  He states, 
“The acts of liberation from the past – exerting independence from parents 
and family, provided a liberation of sorts, but it was now up to the individual to 
determine his own fate.  The discovery of self, therefore, became the first step 
toward the formation of a new identity.”4 
 Chen Duxiu, as one of the leaders of the New Culture Movement, 
viewed individuality as the intellectual basis of existence, and emphasized 
individuality and self-determination as the foundations of his philosophy.  In 
his 1919 essay, “The True Meaning of Life,” Chen exhorts individual Chinese 
to consider the question, what is the ultimate purpose in life?  He leads his 
readers to the point of drawing their own conclusions as they walk with him 
step by step through his explanation of the “meaning of life as understood by 
modern man”.  Consider his key points:5 
The civilization and happiness of society are created by 
individuals and should be enjoyed by individuals.  Society is an 
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organization of individuals – there can be no society without 
individuals… The will and the happiness of the individual should 
be respected.  Society is the collective life of individuals.  To 
carry out one’s will and to satisfy his desires (everything from 
food and sex to moral reputation is “desire”) are the basic 
reasons for the individual’s existence.  People’s happiness in life 
is the result of their own effort and is neither the gift of God nor 
a spontaneous natural product.  Finally, the individual in society 
is comparable to the cell in the body.  Its birth and death are 
transitory.  New ones replace the old.  This is as it should be 
and need not be feared at all.6 
 
 Chen not only holds individuality in the highest regard, but also highly 
values the connections that may be made between individuals.  Basically, he 
makes a case that society is a reflection of the true state of the individuals 
within it.  If individual people take seriously the responsibility for their own 
happiness, then they will be healthier and so will society as a result.  Chen 
summarized his philosophy of what constitutes the ultimate purpose in life this 
way:  “During his lifetime, an individual should devote his efforts to create 
happiness and to enjoy it, and also to keep it in store in society so that 
individuals of the future may also enjoy it, one generation doing the same for 
the next and so on unto infinity.”7  The essay from which this quote comes 
was published in the journal, New Youth, and disseminated to an even wider 
audience through various other periodicals and newspapers of the day. 
 During the late 1980s and early 1990s of the post Mao era, an 
exceptionally influential Chinese culture maker promoted a similar type of 
individuality and personal responsibility through his work.  Cui Jian, the 
Beijing rocker who has been labeled the “Chinese Bob Dylan”, articulated 
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through several of the songs of his early career a need for personal courage 
and what he calls “guts” during the directionless and aimless nature of the 
post Mao period.8  
 To many of his fans he has not only been a critic of the political system, 
but he has also been even more of a symbol of rebellion against fame, 
materialism, and the non-political establishment.9  In the title track from his 
1994 album, “Balls Under the Red Flag”, he laments the fact that so many 
individual Chinese have failed to take the opportunity to forge their own way 
in life and indirectly exhorts his listeners to each choose for himself his own 
set of values and then determine for himself the direction of their lives: 
Suddenly the door opens 
But actually not so sudden 
The time has come 
But who knows what to do? 
The red flag’s still aflutter 
But there’s no fixed direction 
The revolution still continues 
The old men have still more power. 
 
Money flutters in the air 
We have no ideals 
Although the air is clear 
We can’t see any further 
Although our chance has come 
We don’t have the guts for it 
Our personalities are all rounded 
Like balls under the red flag.10 
 
Another post Mao era culture maker who clearly sees the value of self-
determination and the need for individuals to establish for themselves a 
personal value system is the female author Mian Mian.  The protagonist of 
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her popular (and banned-in-China) semi-autobiographical novel, Candy, is a 
young woman who says of herself:  “I deteriorated into a ‘problem child.’  I 
quit trusting anything anyone told me.  Aside from the food that I put into my 
mouth, there was nothing I believed in.  I lost faith in everything.  I was only 
sixteen, but my life was over.  Fucking over.”11  Through this powerful quote, 
she illustrates her protagonist’s disillusionment with life, the frustration she 
confronts as she attempts to determine for herself what she believes to be 
true, how utterly on-her-own she feels, and how these are the impetus for her 
hedonistic pursuits and self-indulgent lifestyle. 
Another powerful identity message regarding individualism during both 
eras was that it was no longer taboo to engage in public discourse on private 
issues.  Whether editorial or fictional, this type of discourse brought into the 
public view and public consciousness issues that had not previously been 
acknowledged or discussed so openly, and provided a forum where 
individuals could discuss social and personal problems.12  In the Republican 
era, literature and printed media were the main vehicles of pop culture 
transmission.  Magazines and newspapers sprung up overnight, and in 1915 
Chen Duxiu began one of the most influential periodicals of the Republican 
era, New Youth (Xin Qingnian).13  Within six months of the May Fourth 
Incident of 1919 over 400 new periodicals appeared on the urban cultural 
scene.14   
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 One such periodical was Life Weekly (Shenghuo Zhoukan), published 
by prominent Shanghai publisher Zou Taofen.  The most popular feature of 
the weekly magazine was reportedly the “Reader’s Mailbox” column.  This 
column allowed individual readers to write in about their personal plights, thus 
exposing thousands of their fellow readers to their concerns and to the 
editor’s answers to them.  Life Weekly created “a collective means of giving 
pluralistic voice to the largest audience China then had:  the urban sojourning 
youth of Shanghai and other cities.”15  Though Life Weekly was one of the 
most widely circulated magazines of its type, literally hundreds of others took 
their cue from Life’s editors and offered columns in the same vein as the 
“Reader’s Mailbox.” 
Periodicals also published editorials, fiction, and factual articles that 
highlighted the importance of the individual by publicly discussing the 
personal issues of that individual.  Mao Zedong wrote one such factual article 
for a Changsha newspaper in 1919.  The article was about a Miss Zhao, the 
daughter of a prominent Changsha family who committed suicide in order to 
escape an arranged marriage.  Mao wrote that Miss Zhao died “because of 
the darkness of the social system, because of the negation of individual will, 
and because she was trapped in a cage made up of three iron nets – her 
family, the family of the intended groom, and Chinese society.”16  How ironic 
that the very “negation of individual will” that Mao condemned in 1919 was at 
 64 
the heart of his political message throughout his reign as China’s foremost 
autocrat. 
A new genre of fiction that grew out of the publication of true stories of 
the type found in the “Reader’s Mailbox” broke onto the Chinese literary 
scene during that same time.  This new genre became known as “problem 
fiction”.  Generally the “problem” this type of fiction addressed was the 
patriarchal oppression of women, which then became the “problem” of a 
broader traditionalism that had tyrannized both men and women.17 
In post Mao China several vehicles exist in urban popular culture for 
public discourse on individual matters.  Literature, music, film, and television 
are the obvious mainstays, but the emergence of talk radio, access to the 
internet, and the proliferation of special interest magazines, newspapers and 
tabloids have increased, exponentially, the number of pop culture vehicles 
available and the number of people using and consuming them. 
Radio personality, Xinran, in her book The Good Women of China, 
talks about hosting a radio call-in show from Nanjing called Words on the 
Night Breeze – one of the first of its kind on state-run radio.  Readers would 
write to Xin Ran, many of them anonymously, asking for advice or simply 
telling their story to someone.  She would read the letters on the air and 
listeners would call into the show to discuss the issues presented in the 
letters.  She said she started the show: 
To try to open a little window, a tiny hole, so that people could 
discuss personal issues in the media, though it was a 
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dangerous undertaking.  It provided an anonymous way in 
which people’s personal questions and concerns could be 
addressed publicly.  Through this type of program, radio went 
from being one of many mouthpieces of the Party to becoming 
more of a mouthpiece of the people, exposing corruption and 
abuses of both an official and personal nature.18   
 
Most often Xinran’s writers spoke of women who were trapped in some 
type of abusive or exploitive relationship with a man, asking for advice on how 
to escape.  One such writer was a young boy who told of an old, crippled man 
in his village who had recently bought a young wife.  The young boy 
continued the story: 
The girl looks very young – I think she must have been 
kidnapped.  This happens a lot around here, but many of the 
girls escape later.  The old man is afraid his wife will run off, so 
he has tied a thick iron chain around her.  Her waist has been 
rubbed raw by the heavy chain – the blood has seeped through 
her clothes.  I think it will kill her.  Please save her. 
“Whatever you do, don’t mention this on the radio.  If the 
villagers find out, they’ll drive my family away.19 
 
Xinran enlisted the help of the local Public Security Bureau.  After the 
initial disinclination of the police to interfere, they eventually found the girl, 
who was only twelve years old.  Reluctantly, the head of the village’s 
agricultural supplies depot was persuaded to threaten to cut off the entire 
village’s supply of fertilizer if they didn’t release her.  The police reunited her 
with her family who had spent a small fortune searching for her.  Though 
Xinran did not receive any accolades for helping the young girl, she saw this 
situation as a powerful illustration of what this new medium of discourse could 
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accomplish, and the power of individual moral conviction (that of the boy who 
wrote into her show) to help change the life of someone in need. 20 
Radio was not the only forum for public discourse explored by the post 
Mao Chinese public.  The advent of the Internet and the availability of 
personal computer usage have produced a large Chinese community of 
virtual communicators.  Urban Chinese were getting the message, more than 
ever before, that opportunities for individual expression were available, 
possibly beneficial, and potentially profitable.  Urban Chinese were also 
getting the message that depending on the means through which you express 
yourself, your personal views and confessions could potentially be available 
to an audience of millions with little or no cost.  In 2006 Microsoft China 
estimated that of the over 200 million users of Myspace® worldwide, 60 
million of them are from Mainland China.21  Personal web logs (blogs) have 
become the latest form of expression, dialogue, and even a confessional for 
Chinese urbanites, especially those of the most computer-savvy set – those 
under the age of thirty.  Even one China Daily article touted the popularity of 
Internet expression with the title “Blogosphere – a new spiritual home for 
China’s youth”.22 
Online venues for individual expression and for the discussion of very 
private issues in an extremely public forum abound.  The Asian Sex Gazette 
is but one example of several online news and question-and-answer forums 
on sex and sexuality.  It has established its online niche with the lofty goal of 
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providing honest and informative reporting on sex in greater China, with 
millions of hits daily from Mainland Chinese.  It offers everything from 
answers to common (and not so common) questions about sex to online 
reviews of sexual products and gay bars on the mainland.23  Topics of the 
available news articles range from the sexual revolution empowering women 
in the metropolitan cities of China to the ills of the sex trade, prostitution, and 
human trafficking.  If one subscribes to their service she will have access to a 
forum entitled “sex chat” where she may write in with questions about sex and 
sexuality, as well as with narratives of her personal sexual experiences.  
Others on the forum may respond online with advice or comments. 
An example of someone who has taken it one step further by 
developing her own online sex blog is the female Chinese blogger Qin Dai.  
She uses her skin – specifically photos of her bare buttocks – on her blog to 
draw attention to the romantic novel she has written, which she is trying to sell.  
She explained that she has chosen to promote her book in this way because 
she has a strong sense of freedom and a deep desire to express herself 
“naturally.”24 
 A third pop culture message on individualism that appears in both eras 
is that experimentation is a valuable pursuit to be undertaken in all areas of 
life, and that through experimentation one may understand one’s true self and 
may invent new modes of expression and experimentation.  Even Lu Xun, 
philosopher and the purported “father of modern Chinese literature” is 
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credited with a quote apropos of this idea, “The first person who tasted a crab 
must also have tried a spider, but realized that it was not good to eat.”25  
Some of the farthest-reaching experiments began as a simple change of 
language on the part of one or more individuals. 
Take, for example, the literary revolution of the New Culture Movement 
of the Republican era.  Before that time all literature had been written in 
formal classical Chinese.  In 1917 Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi sparked this 
literary revolution by calling for all Chinese authors to write what was “simple, 
direct, in the vernacular, and with a human sense of social responsibility.”  
They not only called for this change, but they exemplified it in their own 
writing, eventually making the use of the vernacular by a writer synonymous 
with “modern thinking”.26   
The vernacular, or baihua, became the main medium of 
communication at all levels of education by 1920, and its widespread use 
made literature and non-fiction writing more available to the general public.  
By the 1930s almost all writing was in some form of baihua.27  This new type 
of writing also introduced hundreds of Western-derived vocabulary words into 
Chinese speech, such as feminism, utilitarianism, anarchism, and so on.28 
During the post Mao era, urban language has been forever changed by 
popular fiction writer, Wang Shuo, who took up the Western idea of using 
politics and political rhetoric as fodder for humorous and satirical expression; 
making it popular to distort past uses of official language.  Here is a partial list 
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of some examples of his lexicon.  If someone goes against their own will, they 
will be labeled as “reactionary” (fandong).  Oaths between friends are 
sometimes taken on “President Mao’s head” (xiang Mao Zhuxi baozheng).  
Poker players are said to “study the number 54 document” (wushisi hao 
wenjian); a sardonic reference to a deck of playing cards.  Those Chinese 
leaving the country are said to “join an overseas brigade” (cha yang dui).  
Anyone who retains their assigned state job while working at a second private 
job that pays more money follow the “one entity, two systems” (yiren liangzhi).  
When a male homosexual approaches another male he will ask if he is a 
“comrade” (tongzhi) to determine if he is also gay.29  Adopting this form of 
speaking, and the cynical attitude it reflects has even been labeled as Wang 
Shuo-ism (Wang Shuo zhuyi).30  Wang Shuo took a very big chance by 
experimenting with what had previously been considered hallowed language, 
but the Wang Shuo-ification of modern language in post Mao China continues, 
is constantly changing, and has inspired others to add to the new lexicon. 
Not only did culture makers encourage the consumers of their works to 
experiment, but they also experimented themselves with new forms of 
expression.  Lu Xun, as one of his contemporaries noted of him, “is often at 
the vanguard of creating new forms.”31  His story “The Diary of a Madman”, 
published in 1918, is considered the first “modern” Chinese short story ever 
published.  Lu Xun had a fondness for anything new and experimental, and 
was considered an iconoclast for his valorization of the new.  
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Lu Xun’s short story collection, A Call to Arms, in which “The Diary of a 
Madman” appears, ushered in the use of perspectivism in Chinese literature, 
and endorsed the use of both interior and exterior monologues in fiction, 
which quickly became a fashionable technique among Republican era writers.  
He also experimented with hyperbole and the use of various grotesque 
images in his writing.  In “The Diary of a Madman” Lu Xun uses the idea of 
cannibalism to characterize the cruelty with which the Chinese people treated 
one another.  The protagonist, the madman, sees cannibalism everywhere he 
looks and comes to believe that almost everyone he knows is planning to eat 
him and that his brother is in on the plan. 
They want to eat me, and of course you can do nothing about it 
single-handed; but why must you join them?  As man-eaters 
they are capable of anything.  If they eat me, they can eat you 
as well; members of the same group can still eat each other.  
But if you will just change your ways, change right away, then 
everyone will have peace.  Although this has been going on 
since time immemorial, today we could make a special effort to 
do what is right, and say this can’t be done!  I’m sure you can 
say that, Brother.32 
 
 Lu Xun’s prose poetry collection, Wild Grass, published in 1927, also 
contains several of his most grotesque images such as a corpse speaking 
from the grave and a man gnawing on his own heart.  In this excerpt from the 
prose poem, “Revenge”, he talks of how the body radiates warmth, and that 
people try to attract each other because they are “desperately eager to cuddle, 
kiss and embrace so as to enjoy the intoxicating ecstasy of life.”  Not terribly 
graphic… yet.  He goes on to talk of two specific people: 
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 This being so, the two of them, stripped naked and 
grasping sharp knives, confront each other in the vast 
wilderness. 
 The two of them will embrace, will kill each other… 
 From all sides passers-by hasten there, densely packed 
as tussores (silk worms) crawling up walls or ants carrying off 
salted fish-heads.  They are smartly dressed but empty-handed.  
Yet from all sides they hasten there, and crane their necks 
desperately to feast their eyes on this embrace or slaughter.  
Already they have the foretaste of the sweat or blood on their 
own tongues when it is over. 
 However, the two of them confront each other in the vast 
wilderness, stripped naked and grasping sharp knives, neither 
embracing nor killing and, moreover, showing no intention of 
embracing or killing. 
 … The passers-by become bored.  They feel boredom 
seeping into their pores, feel boredom from their hearts seeping 
out of their pores…  Finally they look at one another blankly and 
gradually disperse, feeling so atrophied that they have even lost 
their interest in life.33 
 
 One of the first group of culture makers in the post Mao era to take 
experimentation with new art forms to a new height was a group known as the 
Fifth Generation Filmmakers (diwu dai).  They are the first class of filmmakers 
to graduate after the Cultural Revolution, in 1982.  Claire Huot, author of 
China’s New Cultural Scene: A Handbook of Changes, describes them this 
way: 
This group of Chinese artists grew up step by step, stride by 
stride, with the People’s Republic of China.  They went through 
the different stages of life during the country’s different socialist 
and post-socialist stages:  infancy during farm reform and 
collective kindergartens; childhood during the anti-rightist 
movement and the first labor camps; preadolescence during 
famine, iron-smelting, and the rupture with the Soviets; 
adolescence during the Cultural Revolution; pre-adult days at 
the onset of reform; and finally adulthood during the current 
reform era.34 
 72 
 The leading two representatives of this illustrious group are Chen 
Kaige and Zhang Yimou.  Their goal in filmmaking was not simply to reach a 
Chinese audience.  They set out to make films that would be interesting to the 
world, often adapting the literary works of their contemporaries, called “roots-
searching” (xungen) literature.  Their films are examples of what is called 
“grabbism” (nalai zhuyi), a term used by Lu Xun, who employed this method 
in his writing by “picking things here and there, from the past as well as other 
cultures, where and when needed.”  The Fifth Generation Filmmakers 
employed this method in their filmmaking.35  These filmmakers are not unified 
by one style so much as by a commitment to “break new ground technically 
and thematically by exploring both their medium and their culture.”36 The Fifth 
Generation Filmmakers’ literary peers were also experimenting in a similar 
vein, cultivating the so-called roots-searching school of literature. 
 One such marriage of literature and film is Zhang Yimou’s first film as a 
director.  He adapted part of the book Red Sorghum by author, Mo Yan, for 
the 1988 film by the same name.  Through this film Zhang Yimou showed his 
“blueprint” for making a film about China that could be successful 
domestically and internationally.  He artfully combined different types of 
Chinese fetishes, while at the same time “combining the original meaning of 
fetish (that which is primitive from an outsider’s point of view) with its later 
meaning (as a transference of the sexual upon objects).  His “blueprint” for 
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“Red Sorghum” is a combination of the Chinese countryside, Chinese old 
things, Chinese traditional arts and crafts, and attractive Chinese women.”37 
 It is a love story set in the late 1930s, about a young couple that meet 
when the young man is one of the bearers of the young woman’s wedding 
sedan.  The woman is on her way to be married to a leper who owns an 
alcohol distillery.  The narrator of the story is a present-day male who is telling 
the story of his grandparents.  The first frames of the movie are a blank 
screen and the voice of the narrator:  “I will tell you the story of my grandpa 
and grandma…” Then “Grandma” appears on screen, not as an elderly 
granny, but as a beautiful twenty-something woman who is played by the 
actress Gong Li.  Even though she is wearing ancient fashion, she looks 
almost contemporary.38 
The two primary images recurring again and again throughout the 
movie are the color red the human body.  Zhang convincingly reorients the 
color red from its Communist and revolutionary value toward its more 
traditional meanings – red as the color of celebration, the color of marriages, 
of life as birth, and even as the blood of death.  The color red is the overtone 
for the entire film, from dyed red color of the alcohol red, to the red dress of 
the woman, to the reddening of a sunset sky.  He also takes in the detail of 
the human body throughout the film:  from the open mouth of the woman, her 
eyes, breasts, and red-shoed feet; the nape of the man’s neck, his back, 
shoulders, and strong legs; evoking all manner of fantasies, mostly sexual.  
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Some of the customs shown in the film are not Chinese at all, but are 
inventions of Zhang’s own imagination.  Even though these inventions read 
as foreign or “other to a Chinese audience, and are read as Chinese to an 
international audience, they still get the same basic story across.39 
 The assortment of identity messages on individualism examined in this 
chapter is but a small portion of the myriad examples that exist in the popular 
cultures of both the Republican and post Mao eras.  The method of 
transmission of the messages or the messages themselves may not be 
identical, but clearly they indicate that the urban popular cultures of the 
Republican and post Mao eras both celebrate similar principles:  that 
individuality is important and worthy of expression; that it is permissible and 
possibly beneficial to discuss private issues in a public setting; that change 
and experimentation are inevitable; and that the individual is valuable apart 
from the collective.  However, each of the examples clearly illustrates that 
while these similar identity messages were prevalent during both eras, they 
were not as prevalent or hardly expressed through the popular culture of the 
intervening Maoist era.  In the next chapter pop culture identity messages 
regarding cosmopolitanism from both eras indicate a parallelism between 
Republican era urban pop culture and that of the post Mao era that is as 
evident as the parallelism illustrated in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Identity Messages on Cosmopolitanism 
 
During both the Republican and post Mao eras China was a newcomer 
in one sense or another – as a fledgling nation it was a newcomer to the 
world stage in the Republican era, and as a formerly isolated country that 
threw its doors wide open to economic opportunity in the post Mao era it was 
a newcomer to the world market.  As China and individual Chinese people 
entered into new territory and began to find their way, they were scrutinized 
by the culture makers of their day.  The comparison of China with other 
nations in the global community was inevitable.  Chinese culture makers were 
no longer able to simply compare China with its previous self in measuring 
progress, and began to compare China with other nations, and view the 
Chinese people in light of individuals from around the world.  Though it had a 
long history and a rich cultural tradition, China was very new to the situation 
that it found itself facing during each era.  As a young child trying to emulate 
it’s more experienced and savvy siblings, China as a fledgling nation (in the 
Republican era) and as an economic newcomer (in the post Mao era) saw its 
need to close the gap between itself and the rest of the nations of the world 
on several fronts, and no one expressed this better than the culture makers of 
each period.1   
Due to the inevitable comparisons of the Chinese with people from the 
rest of the world, cosmopolitanism became an idea around which many 
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culture makers in both eras rallied, often equating the term with modernism.  
At its most basic level, cosmopolitanism is the quality of being “so 
sophisticated as to be at home in all parts of the world or conversant with 
many spheres of interest.  It can also refer to a person or place that “has the 
quality of being pertinent or common to the whole world; or having constituent 
elements from all over the world or from many different parts of the world or 
conversant with many spheres of interest.”2  Since it is often used 
interchangeably with the word modern, it may also refer to the simple qualities 
of being and becoming current, of the present, and up-to-date or 
contemporary with other developed and developing nations in the global 
community.  During both the Republican and post Mao eras China has shifted 
toward a more pluralistic society; a shift toward a society where the 
opportunity exists to choose between a variety of competing ideas and 
alternative ways of living and viewing the world.  Cosmopolitanism and 
pluralism have been fiercely celebrated through pop culture identity 
messages during both eras as the following examples will show. 
One of the first identity messages on cosmopolitanism common to the 
popular cultures of both eras was that for an individual to be truly 
cosmopolitan, he must see himself as a global citizen; someone who is world-
wise and who views himself as a member of the global human community.  
Even Chinese sociologists today recognize that pop culture messages on 
individual identity are set increasingly in the context of the individual as a 
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global citizen, albeit one who happens to be Chinese.3  The same was also 
true during the Republican era. 
Lu Xun is a prime example of one such global citizen, and of 
Republican era universalism in practice.  His writing as well as his own life 
reflected his belief that each individual is a citizen of the whole world.  In his 
writing he practiced the notion of “grabbism” (earlier referred to as nalai zhuyi), 
freely borrowing the best from Chinese culture and the cultures of other 
countries without the anxiety of cultural contamination or subjugation.4  His 
short story, “The True Story of Ah Q”, published in 1921, is the only piece of 
modern Chinese fiction to have received universal international acclaim right 
after its publication.5   
As a student in Japan in the early years of the twentieth century he 
was exposed to Japanese and European writers whom he came to admire, 
and who influenced his writing.  Some of his favorites were those he labeled 
the “Mara” poets.  He credited these poets with the fearsome powers 
associated with the Buddhist god, Mara, the god of destruction and rebellion 
(Byron and Shelly were two of the “Mara” poets Lu Xun liked).  He was 
outspoken in his reverence of the “Mara” poets, stating that they “were firmly 
determined to rebel, devoted their energy to action, and ran counter to the 
common disposition of their contemporaries.”6  Lu Xun embraced his identity 
as a global citizen and encouraged others to do so.  
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One post Mao era equivalent of the global citizen was the lead 
character of the popular Chinese television show “A Beijinger in New York” 
(Beijingren Zai Nu Yue).  The show was first broadcast in 1993, and was a 
collaborative effort between famous post-Mao author, Wang Shuo, and his 
business partner and director of the series, Feng Xiaogang.  The series is 
based on the book by the same name, authored by Cao Guilin.  It is the story 
of a Chinese man, Wang Qiming (played by the very famous Chinese actor of 
“Red Sorghum” fame, Jiang Wen), who immigrates to New York City to live 
out his American dream.  The show’s storyline is not a traditional Confucian 
morality tale, but has universal appeal.  The lessons the characters learn and 
teach, respectively, could be portrayed as convincingly by characters of any 
ethnicity or nationality.  Every character has their light and dark sides, and 
neither China nor the United States comes out as the “winner”.  The city of 
New York itself even shows its heavenly and hellish sides.  Wang Qiming, the 
protagonist, starts out as a hapless immigrant, ignorant of the ways of life in 
America.  By the end of the series he is driving a Mercedes, has a private 
yacht, wears designer clothes, and has a mistress who has helped him attain 
his wealth.  In the process of living his American dream, he has lost his wife 
to divorce, and his daughter is estranged from him.   While not exactly the 
American dream he originally had in mind, Wang Qiming shows how one 
Chinese man lived beyond the borders of his own country and became a 
citizen of the world without changing his nationality.7 
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Another identity message from the pop culture of both eras that further 
explores the global citizen identity is the idea that an individual who is 
cosmopolitan and worldly would be able to recognize that he may share 
something in common with another person based on commonalities other 
than their ethnicity, nationality, or geographic location.  This particular 
message is vividly illustrated through a piece of western literature, written in 
1879 that spearheaded the championing of women’s rights in Republican era 
China.  It was Henrik Ibsen’s play, A Doll’s House.  The protagonist, Nora 
Helmer, is thought to be a silly childish woman by her husband throughout her 
marriage, and though she is no such thing, she continues to act the part to 
maintain a harmonious relationship with her husband.  She does this until she 
can no longer stand the thought of perpetuating the lie she is living.  She 
leaves her unhappy marriage and even her children to forge a life for herself 
after realizing that she wants to live her life and not the life of the woman her 
husband thought she was.8 
Just prior to the Republican era, in 1907, Lu Xun discussed A Doll’s 
House in an essay he wrote from Japan, and taught the play in the early 
years of the Republican era to his students in Beijing and Shanghai (among 
whom was the female author, Ding Ling).  His discussion of the play brought it 
to the attention of Chen Duxiu, the man who in 1915 founded the magazine 
New Youth.  Chen Duxiu was also a champion of women’s rights, and 
published a complete vernacular translation of Ibsen’s play, A Doll’s House, in 
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New Youth in 1918.  As a result, the play experienced immediate popularity 
among urban Chinese and its protagonist became a media heroine who was 
heralded as a modern feminist.  Her name, Nora, became synonymous with 
women everywhere who stood up for their rights, thus leading thousands of 
Chinese women to identify with a fictional Norwegian character from the end 
of the previous century.9 
Popular culture in the post Mao era also contains several examples of 
universalism of this sort, where a media hero from another culture provides 
the voice for a large number of Chinese individuals who.  For Chinese 
musicians and music fans, American rocker Kurt Cobain has been one such 
hero.  As the former lead singer of the band Nirvana, he is considered the 
standard-bearer of sincerity and realism in rock music, praised for his free-
spirited style, his cynicism, and his rejection of the rock institution and the 
trappings of stardom.  The fact that Cobain would cross-dress in a very un-
macho way for interviews and that the band would often destroy their 
instruments after each show “for pure fun so as not to have to do encores” 
was seen as evidence of his commitment to be true to himself and to not fall 
prey to the trappings and expectations of the rock “industry”.  His suicide in 
1994 is heralded by his admirers in China (and around the world) as the 
ultimate act of total commitment to his ideals.10 
Pop culture maven, Sun Mengjin, is a Chinese rock fan and critic who 
has run an evening radio show since 1993 that airs twice a week courtesy of 
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The Shanghai Eastern Broadcasting Corporation, and his following is 
immense.  He is a self-described “unrepentant fan of radical rock figures like 
Jim Morrison, Jimmy Hendrix, and Kurt Cobain.”  He punctuates his on-air 
time with nihilistic phrases such as, “I don’t live well, that is my freedom” (wo 
huode bu yukuai, zhe shi wo de ziyou), and quotes from his own poetry, 
which speaks of life’s bleakness and the force and wonder of authentic rock.  
Sun often says, “Rock is life, stark-naked.”11  Sun brought Beijing’s 
underground band, No (the name of the band is in English), to the attention of 
Chinese music fans as one of several Chinese bands who model themselves, 
at least philosophically, after Kurt Cobain and Nirvana.  No’s lead singer, Zu 
Zhou, describes his band’s songs as being of the “no future” type of music: 
sadomasochistic, slasher, schizoid, scatological.  The band members 
represent themselves mainly as dogs, and the imagery of their songs features 
such things as crawling creatures, unusual sexual couplings, and excrement, 
just to name a few.  The titles of their songs leave no doubt as to their outlook 
on life:  “Flies, ants, maggots and bottles, anus, alcohol” (Canying, mayi, qu 
he pingzi, gangmen, jiu); and “I am a snake in your flushing toilet” (Wo shi ni 
choushui matongli de yitiao she).  Sun Mengjin, the rock DJ mentioned earlier, 
writes, “The No band’s music does not come out of China’s countryside, it 
comes from some graveyard, perhaps all of humanity’s graveyard.”12  It is 
possible that in taking what they have from Kurt Cobain’s and Nirvana’s 
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nihilistic examples the No band has itself become a universal harbinger for 
postindustrial angst. 
Multiple identity messages about cosmopolitanism from both eras have 
fused the label, cosmopolitan, with certain attitudes.  While several vehicles of 
pop culture transmission relay messages about aligning oneself with and 
subscribing to modern attitudes about all aspects of life, nothing has relayed 
that message more than advertising.  One cosmopolitan attitude that 
advertising promoted during both eras was that sexuality is not something to 
hide, but to be celebrated.  The advertising maxim that “sex sells” was very 
apparent in Republican era ads.   Paintings and photographs of modern, 
respectable women replaced the public image of the courtesan, although 
some of these images of “more respectable” women used by advertisers were 
at least as provocative as those that had been previously found in the 
courtesan journals.13  Notice the images of the 4 advertising posters below.  
Figures one and two show pretty, modern women who are fairly demure, and 
who are advertising a Chinese brand of cigarettes and cosmetics, 
respectively.  
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Figure three shows a more provocative pose in an advertisement for a 
pharmacy, and figure four shows a downright risqué pose in an advertisement 
for another pharmacy, where the model reveals her right breast.  
Advertisements like these were very popular and prevalent in Republican era 
China. 
During the Post Mao era not only have for-profit companies sought to 
sell their goods and services with provocative advertising, but government 
ministries have also jumped on the “sex sells” bandwagon.  Even the Chinese 
Ministry of Culture, long considered a stronghold of hard-line party 
conservatives for years, had a very short stint on that bandwagon.  It’s official 
publication, China Culture Gazette (CCG), had always been chock full of 
bombastic tirades of CCP propaganda, until 1993.  That is the year the 
weekend edition of the CGC, called Cultural Weekend, totally changed its 
colors.  Some say it changed from its usual revolutionary red tone to the 
yellow tone of soft-core pornography overnight.  In the first issue of that year, 
Cultural Weekend printed a front-page interview with Chinese movie queen, 
Liu Xiaoqing, on the subject of nudity, and included many photos of seminude 
and nude women throughout the publication (Asian women as well as busty 
Westerners).  It sold out in record time and word on the street was that 
Cultural Weekend had become “the coolest paper in Beijing.”  The newly 
appointed editor of Cultural Weekend, who was the visionary behind the 
nudity publication, was a former Red Guard named Zhang Zuomin.  He was 
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told to make the paper profitable, and even his hard-line chief editor stood 
behind him when the head of the Ministry of Culture wanted to discipline 
Zhang.  The chief editor defended Zhang’s actions and said he had 
successfully accomplished what no other editor of Cultural Weekend had 
done – turn a profit.14 
Advertising has not been the only means of promoting the attitude that 
sexuality is to be celebrated.  Mainstream literature also began to explore this 
otherwise taboo issue, as well as exploring greater social interaction between 
the sexes, and new sexual mores.  In Ding Ling’s 1928 story, Miss Sophie’s 
Diary, we find a Republican era protagonist who allows us into her thoughts 
and feelings through the diary she keeps, and we are allowed to watch her 
wrestle with her own budding sexuality, among other things.  While one of the 
prevailing themes of the book has to do with Sophie’s self-pitying and fretful 
disappointment with life, the portions of the book dealing with sexuality, and 
female sexuality in particular, are very progressive for the period in which it 
was written.  Sophie is a tubercular twenty-year-old woman living alone in 
Beijing, away from her family.  She is the narrator of the story (which is told 
completely from her point of view through entries into her diary), and through 
that narrative brings up all manner of issues such as independence and 
autonomy from family, gender roles, dating, pre-marital cohabitation of men 
and women, sexual desire, lust, and love.  Sophie no longer goes to school 
because of her illness, and she relies on her friends to help take care of her.  
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She has male friends and female friends who frequent the room she rents 
from a hostel while convalescing.  One of her male friends, Wei, has fallen in 
love with her, but Sophie can’t be bothered with his simpering overtures.  She 
thinks he is a sweet but pathetically predictable and naïve.  What does 
capture her attention is a tall young student from Singapore who is the friend 
of a friend.  This is how she describes him after their first meeting: 
The tall man's a real good looker. It's the first time I've 
ever been aware of male beauty – it's not something I'd ever 
noticed before. I always thought that there was nothing more to 
being a man than being able to talk, read people's expressions 
and be careful… 
How can I describe the beauty of that stranger? Of 
course, his tall body, his delicate white face, his thin lips and his 
soft hair would all dazzle anyone, but there's also an elegance 
about him that I can't express in words or put my hands on, but 
sets my heart aflame.  For example, when I asked him his name 
he handed me his card in an incredibly relaxed way. I looked up, 
and saw the corners of his soft, red, and deeply inset mouth. 
Could I tell anyone how I looked at those two delightful lips like 
a child longing for sweets?15 
Sophie takes the initiative to seek out this young man so she can get to 
know him, often trying to put herself in his way so that he will notice her.  She 
is the pursuer.  Her interest is based solely on his good looks, though she 
hopes that his personality and his heart will excite her imagination as much as 
has his physical appearance.  As she gets to know this young man, Ling Jishi, 
Sophie has to admit to herself that despite the fact that he bores her 
intellectually and has a personality that she finds distasteful, she is still 
enamored with the way he looks and lusts after him relentlessly. 
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No matter how dreadful his ideas are, there's no doubt that he 
drives my emotions wild. So why don't I admit I'm in love with 
him? I'm certain that if he were to hold me in a close embrace 
and let me kiss him all over then throw me into the sea or a fire 
I'd gladly shut my eyes to greet the death that would preserve 
my love forever. I have fallen in love with him; it'll be enough for 
me if he gives me a good death.16 
 
In between bouts of longing for Ling Jishi and feeling disgusted with 
herself for such blatant lust, Sophie weaves through her narrative a tapestry 
of her everyday life and that of her fellow students in Beijing by casually 
mentioning things that would still be considered quite shocking to many 
people of that era, except the most progressive.  She mentions how her friend, 
Yufang, is planning to move in with her boyfriend, Yunlin.  She also mentions 
just as casually how Yufang and Yunlin don’t want to get pregnant since they 
are not married and are still in school, and so they decide to live apart 
because they will be “safer” from a pregnancy standpoint.  These issues, and 
so many of the other issues upon which Miss Sophie’s Diary touches are 
ones that were not only new topics of open discussion in Chinese society, but 
were also the hot topics of Ding Ling’s contemporaries who were students at 
the time or living on the fringe of student society in Beijing and Shanghai.  
Ding Ling’s was one of the first Chinese female literary voices of the 
Republican era to successfully pioneer frank female exploration of sexuality in 
her work. 
Lu Xun also weighed in on the subject of sexuality; specifically, what 
he saw as the one-sided view of chastity for women (when such chastity was 
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not demanded of men).  In an essay he published in New Youth in 1918 
entitled “My Views on Chastity” he responded to the tradition that required all 
women to maintain their chastity before marriage and after the death of their 
husbands, which was sacrosanct in Confucian culture.  
In what way do unchaste women injure the country?  It is only 
too clear today that ‘the country is faced with ruin.’  There is no 
end to the dastardly crimes committed, and war, banditry, 
famine, flood, and drought follow one after the other.  But this is 
owing to the fact that we have no new morality or new science 
and all our thoughts and actions are out of date.  That is why 
these benighted times resemble the old dark ages.  Besides, all 
government, army academic, and business posts are filled by 
men, not by unchaste women.  And it seems unlikely that the 
men in power have been so bewitched by such women as to 
lose all sense of right and wrong and plunge into dissipation.17 
 
Lu Xun logically argued for a single moral standard regarding sexuality to be 
applied to all people, and for an end to the ignorant postulations that men 
were morally superior to women.  He went on to advocate committing oneself 
to “see to it that all mankind knows legitimate happiness” over commitment to 
any tradition that tyrannizes and causes the meaningless suffering of another 
human being.18 
In the post Mao era there are many examples in literature that openly 
explore individual sexuality and changing sexual mores.  One of the first to do 
so, considered a watershed in the contemporary Chinese literary world, was 
the book The Abandoned Capital (Feidu)19, also referred to in English as The 
Defunct Capital, by respected Chinese writer Jia Pingwa, published in 1993.  
The book is a work of soft porn fiction; a roman a clef20 that was said to be 
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“the most salacious Chinese sex story since the famous late-Ming 
Jingpingmei.”  The book is a chronicle of the life and adventures of a 
lascivious and famous writer named Zhuang Zhidie.  Zhuang lives in a 
provincial city that sadly tries to bask in the glory it once had as the former 
capital.  While the story is mainly about Zhuang and how his fame in the 
literary world brings him attention that eventually leads to his fall from grace, 
the story is interspersed with generous helpings of sex.  The sex depicted in 
the book is all the more titillating because of the attention the author drew to 
those passages that he evidently expunged from the text, presumably, 
because they were too explicit for print and would not make it past 
government censors.  Jia Pingwa teases his readers with notes in the sex 
scenes that say such things as “Here the writer deleted 330 words.”21  
Readers were supposed to take this to mean that the material that was 
removed from the text was even hotter than the censors (or possibly the 
readers) could handle.22  This brief excerpt from the book serves as a prime 
example of how this particular literary device of Jia’s worked: 
Zhuang Zhidie’s mother, who shared the tiny flat, was 
asleep. 
His wife quickly slipped out of her clothes. 
“But you’re not wearing any underclothes, not even a 
bra!” exclaimed Zhuang Zhidie. 
“All the easier for you to get on with the job,” she replied. 
He pushed her into the imitation leather seat, lifted her 
legs up and apart, and set to work kissing her nether regions. 
(here the author has expunged 42 
characters). 
Her squirming only served to excite further Zhuang’s 
passion.  His tongue and mouth worked busily. 
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Suddenly he felt an itch on his back.  He had his wife 
scratch it for him. 
“It’s a mosquito.  What’s a mosquito doing inside in the 
middle of the day?” she wondered.  She scratched away and 
then exclaimed, 
“What do you think you’re biting?  Whaaaatttt, 
whoaaaaa….” 
She abandoned her scratching as her eyes stared 
heavenward, her body going quite stiff.  Zhuang Zhidie felt a 
wave of warm liquid come streaming forth. 
(here the author has expunged 333 
characters). 
Zhuang stood up and looked at her with a smirk on his 
face.  She asked, 
“What’s it taste like?” 
“You try it,” Zhuang responded as his mouth met hers.  
As he straightened up, he cried in pain and fell onto her body. 
“What’s wrong?” she asked. 
“My foot still hurts.” 
“So you can’t really use all your strength.” 
“I’m fine,” he responded, and with that he started up 
again. 
“Let me do some of the work this time,” she said. 
She stood up and let him sit down. 
(here the author has expunged 25 
characters). 
“Don’t cry out, the old woman will hear us.” 
“I don’t care,” she said, and she cried out regardless.  He 
stuffed a handkerchief into her mouth, which she bit on hard. 
(here the author has expunged 18 
characters). 
“Hurry up and get dressed,” Zhuang Zhidie said.23 
 
The further the reader works through Zhuang’s chronicle, the more 
women Zhuang works his way through sexually.  As Geremie Barmé writes in 
his analysis of contemporary Chinese culture, In the Red, “The women that 
Zhuang works his way through during the unfolding tale are for the most part 
pathetic and fawning creatures, crudely depicted sex objects whose bodily 
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fluids act as the connective glue of the plot.”24  The Abandoned Capital may 
have been post Mao China’s first sexually explicit novel published by a 
Chinese author, but it would not be the only one.  Several more authors 
followed Jia Pingwa’s lead, many of whom have seen their work relegated to 
the ditan wenxue category of fiction – literature sold at sidewalk stalls and by 
street vendors.  Several of those authors have been women; women of 
China’s new generation artists, who were born between 1970 and 1980.  One 
such artist is Yin Lichuan. 
Yin Lichuan is an outspoken writer, critic, and filmmaker.  She 
graduated from Beijing University in 1996 with a degree in French, completed 
a graduate degree in filmmaking in France two years later, and then returned 
to China to work.  She is a pioneer of a literary movement that started among 
Chinese poets in the late 1990s called “Lower Body” Literature (xia ban shen 
wenxue), thus named for its provocative style and explicit references to sex, 
crime, drug use, and violence.  Yin and other writers of the Lower Body genre 
use sex as a metaphor – for independence and autonomy, equality, strength 
and power, etc.  Sexuality in Lower Body writings is also used as a means for 
exploring and expressing individual identity.  Some of her best known poems 
are “If You Ask Me This Was Rigged,” “Man Throwing Up,” and “Fucker.”  In 
her poem “Why Can’t We Make It Feel Even Better?,” Yin talks about a 
woman who is having anonymous sex with a man she just met, and about the 
instructions she gives him to “make it feel even better.”  Sex in this instance 
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could be viewed as a metaphor for power and for liberation – the woman in 
the poem “owns” her desires and is not afraid to ask for what she really wants, 
which is her own pleasure.  Here is an English translation of the poem. 
 
Hey, move it just a little higher, a little lower, to the left, no, to 
the right 
We’re not making love, we’re driving nails 
Uh, a little faster, a little slower, a little tighter, no, more relaxed 
We’re not making love, we’re sweeping out the smut, or maybe 
lacing our boots 
Hmm, a little deeper, a little shallower, a little harder if you 
please 
We’re not making love, we’re composing a poem, enjoying a 
massage 
We’re washing our hair, we’re bathing our feet 
 
Why can’t we make it feel a little better, O make it feel a little 
better 
A little gentler, a little softer, a little more depraved 
A tad more intellectual, more popular if you please 
Why can’t we make it feel a little better?25 
 
The avant-garde style of Yin Lichuan and her contemporaries of the “Lower 
Body” genre created a massive controversy when they began to hit the 
Chinese literary scene in 1999.  The “Lower Body” poets were both 
denounced and lauded by critics and the public, and the effect of their work 
and the distinctive voice with which they wrote was so recognizable that other 
authors were being lumped into this genre as they were praised or criticized 
for their similarity to “Lower Body” writings.26  
Three female authors who have been categorized as “Lower Body” 
writers each published novels in China within a four-year period from 1999 to 
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2002.  Mian Mian’s Candy, Wei Hui’s Shanghai Baby, and Chun Sue’s Beijing 
Doll are semi-autobiographical novels filled with explicit descriptions of sexual 
encounters, casual couplings, drug use, violence, and a full range of 
characters from the underbelly of China’s urban scene.27  The authors narrate 
their stories from the perspective of their protagonists, whose voices are so 
starkly individualistic and detached that you can almost feel the loneliness 
emanating from the pages.  It is not surprising that all three books were 
banned from sale in China.  In the book Beijing Doll, author Chun Sue’s 
protagonist is a fourteen year-old girl who narrates her life as a teenager in 
Beijing.  When she speaks about her experiences in school and her 
classmates she does so with an emotional depth that is completely lacking 
when she speaks of her sexual experiences; those she speaks of with a 
dispassionate voice, in almost matter-of-fact terms.  Her story alludes to a life 
that many in China may find hard to believe exists for someone so young.  
Here is an excerpt from the book where she describes one of her early sexual 
experiences (though not her first) at the age of fourteen, with the college-aged 
lead singer of a Beijing band: 
The next day he invited me over to an apartment he’d 
rented at Tree Village, which people called Rock ‘n’ Roll Village.  
I didn’t have anything better to do, so I went.  We met at Beijing 
Normal, then rode our bikes way out to Tree Village together.  
He took me to his apartment in the western suburbs, really close 
to my stupid school.  A foul-smelling river snaked its way 
through the area.  He showed me his paintings, which were in 
several folios.  One had nothing but green paintings.  He called 
it “The Hell in My Dreams.” 
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Going to bed with him seemed perfectly natural.  Like the 
first time, with Li, I didn’t even ask if he had a girlfriend.  I hadn’t 
made love in half a year at least, and he hurt me a lot; I 
screamed while he was on top of me.  He just snickered.  
“You’re not a virgin, are you?” he asked.  That got to me. 
“Neither are you, so what difference does it make?  Your 
problem is you only took me to bed because you thought I was 
a virgin.  You’re too old-fashioned to be in rock ‘n’ roll.”   
I demanded that he get off.  He smiled and told me not to 
be angry, that he was just teasing.28   
 
Figure 5 
  “Brunettes Are So Hot Right Now” – Shanghai, 2006 
  
 
Mian Mian’s novel, Candy, is probably the rawest of the three “Lower 
Body” novels mentioned earlier.  It tells the story of a single young woman 
from Shanghai named Hong (“Red”) who moves to Shenzhen to live life 
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independently from her family.  She chronicles her experiences from the first 
time she has sex to her experiments with drugs, and her own eventual drug 
addiction that develops after moving in with her drug addict boyfriend.  Her 
descriptions are plaintive, gritty, and straightforward with no hint at the 
romanticism associated with many young female writers.  Here she describes 
the first time she has sex: 
His full lips were on my breasts.  He was the first man to 
kiss my breasts; he had made me this picture, given me this 
picture I loved.  When I touched his hair, he quickly undid my 
clothes, and his tongue made my heart skip.  He moved me, 
and I stroked his hair.  His hair was so beautiful! 
But when he pulled my body underneath him, I felt myself 
go suddenly cold.  I wasn’t even completely undressed, but in a 
moment he was inside me.  It hurt a lot.  Just like that, he had 
shoved his penis into my body.  I lay motionless, the pain boring 
up into my heart, and I was mute with pain, unable to move. 
He wasn’t using his tongue on me anymore, and I felt let 
down.  Except for the noise of his ever-quickening breathing, he 
didn’t make a sound until it was over, and the whole thing 
seemed so ridiculous that I was overcome with sadness. 
Finally he pressed his whole body against me for the first 
time and kissed me on the mouth.  Until then, the bastard hadn’t 
even kissed me on the mouth.  And then he smiled at me, his 
full lips curving up, his eyes twinkling sweetly.  In that moment, 
his face became once again the face I’d seen at the bar, a face 
that was nothing like the face he’d worn when he was fucking 
me.29 
 
Hong, Candy’s protagonist, also maintains a very matter-of-fact 
attitude toward homosexuality and those struggling with their sexual 
orientation.  The following passage illustrates this:  
A couple of my girlfriends have been staying at my place 
temporarily.  They’re lovers.  At one point I told them about 
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some meetings for lesbians, but they went only twice, and they 
never went back.  They didn’t think of themselves as lesbians. 
A. was androgynous.  She was bright-eyed and had a 
generous mouth.  She was short statured (sic) and 
hunchbacked and walked duck-footed…  A. was attracted only 
to women, and she had a powerful sex drive.  Her most 
cherished dream was to get a sex-change operation.  She felt 
that if she could only be a man from the inside out, life would be 
a little easier.  A. came from a small town in Henan and had 
studied pipa – the Chinese lute – and classical piano.  She 
couldn’t stand the prejudiced way that people in her hometown 
had always looked at her, so she traveled to one of the open 
cities in the hopes of making her career there… 
In any case, gay or straight, what did it matter as long as 
you could love someone?  And I was thinking that even though 
A. and B. lived exhaustingly difficult lives, they were happy 
because they loved each other.  They worked hard every day 
for that sex-change operation.  They were sharing in the labor, 
and they would share the fruits of that labor as well.30 
 
After living through a roller coaster relationship with her boyfriend in 
Shenzhen, Hong moves back to her parents’ home in Shanghai, disillusioned, 
depressed, apathetic, and miserable.  Mian Mian vividly reveals Hong’s 
hopelessness through multiple stints in rehab and thwarted suicide attempts.  
Here Hong talks about her second time entering drug rehab: 
The second time my father brought me to the clinic, I was 
bald, one of my eyes was messed up, and I was so thin it was 
disgusting.  I barely recognized myself.  So who would have 
thought that when I approached the big locked door to the ward, 
one of the women would shout my name and cry out, “She’s 
back!  She’s back!  And this time she’s lost all of her hair.”31 
 
 The following excerpt appears in the book after Hong goes home from 
rehab the second time, and admits to herself that she no longer wants to live: 
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In the winter of my twenty-fifth year, a naked purity I 
hadn’t been looking for came to me in a flash.  There was 
nothing for me to do anymore but leave a pretty corpse. 
One Monday morning, my elaborate plans for a ‘natural 
gas incident’ were foiled by my father’s unexpected return.  He 
knocked down the door, and the next thing I saw was a pool of 
my father’s blood. 
Once again there was an ambulance in front of our 
building.  A medic ordered my father to hold up the oxygen bag 
with one hand while helping to support the stretcher with the 
other.  The sound of the medics’ voices as they criticized my 
father for moving too slowly stabbed at my ears, and the sight of 
my father’s old and haggard face sent me into 
unconsciousness.32 
 
Throughout Candy, Mian Mian smacks her readers in the face with a 
cornucopia of jaw-dropping subjects for which she provides no easy answers 
– sexual promiscuity, drug use, violence, addiction, homosexuality, 
depression, suicide, etc.  Hong’s matter-of-fact narration throughout the novel, 
sprinkled with stream-of-consciousness thoughts by the protagonist almost 
makes the reader begin to believe that this person is just another girl trying to 
find herself, that all of her experiences are more commonplace in urban China 
than he originally thought,  and that she could be his friend.  That aspect of 
Candy, and of many other novels of the “Lower Body” genre, is what makes 
these novels so potentially powerful.  They familiarize the reader with the 
problems and lifestyles of the protagonists, and the more often the reader 
finds this type of character in the stories he reads, the less extraordinary 
these characters sound and the more ordinary their lives become to him. 
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Non-fiction writing in China also illustrates changing sexual mores.  In 
his collection of powerful personal narratives entitled China Candid: The 
People on the People’s Republic, leading Chinese journalist Sang Ye 
illustrates changing attitudes toward sex in 1990s China through these 
excerpts from his interview with a female Chinese obstetrician-turned-sex-
shop-manager who was educated in the States.  She works in a privately 
owned sex shop.  He calls her Dr. Sex: 
She works in the Garden of Eden, Beijing.  All of the 
employees wear white coats, like doctors in hospitals, including 
the part-time shop assistants.  Many of them are out-of-towners 
with strong Hunan or Anhui country accents.  They haven’t had 
a chance to acquire the polite hypocrisy of city folk yet, and they 
ask all customers the same question:  “Are you going to buy 
that?”  They get paid according to how much they sell. 
She was wearing a white coat as well, and leaning on the 
counter that featured blow-up girl dolls and massage 
paraphernalia.  She had a long chat with the friend who had 
taken me there to make the initial introduction and then 
suddenly seemed to notice me. 
“Anyway, this is where I’ve ended up.  Our store is part of 
a chain.  We have branches in lots of cities, though a few other 
outfits have been pirating our name.  We’ve brought lawsuits 
against them. 
“I’m just a shop assistant, really.  What you see is what I 
do every day.  I provide consulting services for the customers.  
Part of it is recommending the various products sold here, but I 
don’t exaggerate their effectiveness.  I certainly wouldn’t advise 
anyone to buy China-made Indian Miracle Oil for instance, or 
God of War rings (which don’t do a thing for you), or Superman 
condoms.  If I did, then I’d be going against my medical code of 
ethics.  What I will do is give advice about contraception to 
people having premarital sex, give out information on how to get 
an abortion, reassure people on issues such as whether 
masturbating to orgasm will affect your memory, suggest 
medicines suitable for older people, advise paraplegics on how 
they can make love, and so on.  These are areas within the 
range of my professional competence.  I help people attain 
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pleasure for its own sake and have more fulfilling sex lives.  It’s 
a philanthropic enterprise; and it’s a job that brings me personal 
satisfaction.  It also provides a lot of original material for my 
research.  And it brings money.  I need the money… 
“Sex shops have existed in China for some years now.  
They started out selling sex aids and aphrodisiacs, though 
recently they’ve taken a more professional direction; so we have 
sex chain-stores like this one.  For the moment, the authorities 
employ a policy of peaceful coexistence.  They don’t encourage 
us, but they don’t stop us either.  So long as we pay our taxes, 
they turn a blind eye to where the money comes from. 
“Generally speaking, apart from underground porn, most 
of which is of very poor quality, there’s nothing you can get in 
the West that you can’t find in our shops, whether you’re talking 
about sex aids or medicines.  Among the items we can display 
openly are this Big Mouth inflatable woman and battery-
operated vibrators and dildos, including this one with its G-spot 
and clitoral stimulators.  The larger models are for vaginal 
insertion, and the narrower ones for the anus; they can twitch, 
vibrate, or wiggle.  In America, you can only get some of these 
things by mail order or in out-of-the-way shops in red-light 
districts. 
“When people say that freedom of the press and sexual 
liberation are safety valves for the release of antisocial energies, 
it seems to make sense, but it’s not the whole story.  Our 
nascent sexual awakening is just the first wave.  The Chinese 
people are finally realizing their humanity, though not in the 
sense that’s understood by the party or the state.  If they can’t 
accommodate what is happening, then the people themselves 
need to develop an awareness of human rights, and that may 
well begin with an awareness of the rights of women, as well as 
a heightened environmental consciousness, then concern about 
ethnic issues, and regional consciousness.  All of these things 
will nudge the society as a whole towards a true awakening, and 
once that happens, there’ll be no turning back.”33 
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Figure 6 
 Beijing Sex Shop, 2006 
 
 
Another cosmopolitan convention promoted through pop culture 
identity messages from both eras is the ideal of the modern family.  Alongside 
the essays of Chen DuXiu and other intellectuals attacking the Confucian 
tradition of the extended family structure (da jiazu), several popular 
periodicals of the Republican era also promoted the nuclear family (xiao 
jiating) – consisting of a married couple and their unmarried children – as the 
ideal, and even spoke in favor of a variety of patterns of cohabitation or free 
love.  In the late 1920s Life Weekly (Shenghuo Zhoukan) projected this ideal 
through articles and advertising.  Life Weekly’s promotion of the ideal family 
also included an array of related changes, including more open social 
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interaction between men and women, the freedom to choose one’s own 
marriage partner, the expectation that adult children would establish their own 
household with their new spouse once they married (breaking with the 
tradition of establishing their home within the household of the groom’s 
parents), and complete autonomy of adult couples over their own property – 
providing for greater ease of property division in the event of divorce.  Another 
change affecting marriage and the choice of one’s partner promoted in the 
periodicals was an insistence that marriage be built upon mutual love and 
commitment rather than upon a business contract negotiated by two families.  
The notion that an individual (in this case two individuals) would need 
personal autonomy and space where he may make his own decisions and 
conduct his life in some semblance of privacy independent from his family, 
was a radical idea indeed.34 
Life Weekly (Shenghuo Zhoukan) presented an image of the family 
that was considered quite progressive at the time.  This progressiveness was 
displayed most notably in their advice column.  The column was filled with 
impassioned cries from readers who were experiencing their own clashes 
with traditional views and attitudes about love and marriage.  Here is just one 
example:  “My family is old-fashioned… My father intends to marry me off to 
the decadent son of a corrupt bureaucrat!… I have been very close to 
someone lately… Our love led to physical intimacy… and I am carrying the 
consequence of our love!… My father threatens to put me to death.”  Most of 
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the letters conveyed an extreme urgency, such as a wedding that would take 
place within a week, some deadline imposed by the family patriarch, or a 
threat by the family to end financial support unless their expectations were 
met.  Life Weekly regularly reported the suicides it’s young male and female 
readers committed because they were caught in various dilemmas in their 
struggle against traditional family values.  Most readers, especially the most 
panicked and confused, treated the editor’s opinions as guidance for action 
rather than as the editorial commentary they were.35 
Not only did periodicals and advertising lift up the nuclear family as the 
ideal, but they also painted a portrait of how the home of the nuclear family 
should look:  a neat and immaculate place managed by a full-time 
housewife.36  An entire imaginary ideal of urban modernity was constructed 
through the pages of many of the popular periodicals, especially those 
targeting women.  Material culture was at the heart of this imaginary ideal, 
and it was particularly evident in advertising.  Some of the more common 
modern products promoted through Republican era advertising were things 
such as Quaker Oats, Colgate Dental Cream, Momilk, and Fab detergent.  
Advertising helped to reconstruct a list of new luxuries and daily necessities 
for the modern urban household – electric cooking pots, cameras and Kodak 
film, gas burners, gramophones and records, fountain pens, etc., and 
reinforced the impression that all modern, cosmopolitan families possessed 
these items by showing photographs of a small nuclear family, with just one 
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father, one mother, and their unmarried children, using such items.  The 
photographs also showed people who sported modern fashions and modern 
hairstyles while using their modern products in their modern home.37 The 
message became “this is the desirable and attainable ideal – to be a modern 
family.” 
Post Mao era China is not far different from Republican era China in 
endorsing the idea of the modern, urban family and lifestyle.  The idea of the 
modern family in post Mao China still includes the Republican era version of 
the nuclear family (minus multiple offspring), but the idea has expanded to 
accommodate other contemporary variations.  One such variation is the “open 
marriage” illustrated in this vignette from Annie Wang’s novel The People’s 
Republic of Desire: 
For Beibei and her husband Hua, adultery is not a good 
word.  They call their union an open marriage.  Married with 
extramarital affairs is the most apt description of their lifestyle.  
Both Beibei and Hua belong to the growing group who claim 
that they are too lazy to get a divorce. 
“What’s the point,” says Hua. 
“Men are all the same,” claims Beibei echoing the familiar 
mantra of women with unfaithful husbands. 
Beibei not only doesn’t believe in fidelity within marriage 
anymore; she is also among the rising population of white-collar 
young Chinese that embrace the idea of the one-night stand.  
Traditional Confucian moral values that the Chinese have clung 
to for thousands of years have simply lost their validity and 
make little sense in this world of instant gratification.  If you see 
something you like, go for it.  This is the new dogma. 
According to a recent survey, 37 percent of all one-night 
stands take place between partners who meet on the Internet.  
Beibei doesn’t like the uncertainty of the information 
superhighway.  She sticks with the traditional way, picking up 
guys or waiting for guys to pick her up in bars, at dance clubs, 
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or even on the street.  This way she won’t be surprised or 
disappointed on the initial meeting. 
Beibei tells Lulu and me about her most recent 
rendezvous with men on the street.  “It’s so easy.  Sometimes, I 
just wear some makeup and revealing clothes.  As I walk on the 
street, men come to me and ask me if I’d be interested in being 
their girlfriend for a day or two.  It’s all upfront – there’s no need 
to wonder if he will call you the next day.” 
Beibei is daring, but she also sets a rule for herself:  no 
repetitions – one time and she’s done.  For her, the most 
embarrassing moment is to meet her playmate again in the 
same bar they first met.  Normally, she pretends that she 
doesn’t know the man and looks for new faces to talk to. 
One night, Beibei brings Lulu and me to a place called 
The Bananas.  As we order some cocktails, Beibei spots Luyi, 
her passionate fling from just yesterday.  As usual, she ignores 
his existence.  But Luyi walks toward her.  Beibei starts to 
complain, “That guy that is walking toward us was with me last 
night.  It looks like he wants to bother me again.  Let’s get out.”38 
 
Another type of family model that is popular, especially among single, 
young, urbanites, is what I call the “friends as family” model.   Television 
shows, film, and literature are peppered with young, single, urban adults living 
independently from their parents and in a more free-flowing communal 
arrangement with multiple friends.  Many of their roommates come and go, 
but their “family” is usually organized around one or two close friends or a 
lover, who have displaced the role parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, and 
cousins used to fill as sounding board, community, confessor, and advisor.  
This family model runs counter to the that of traditionalists who, even after 
years of socialist propoganda, still believe that blood relatives are the most 
important influences in the life of an individual.  Wei Hui’s novel Shanghai 
Baby, and the film by the same name (presented at the Cannes Film Festival 
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in 2007), illustrate how this type of arrangement often becomes the most 
important support system some young urbanites have.  This excerpt from the 
book is from the perspective of the books main character, Coco, as she talks 
about her boyfriend, Tian Tian and why she lives with him:   
He watched me in silence.  His strange story grabbed me 
immediately, because I am drawn to tragedy and intrigue…  
Looking tenderly into his fragile, beautiful face, I understood the 
root of Tian Tian’s sadness. 
His eyes grew wet, and he clenched his hands tightly.  
“But I’ve found you and decided to put my faith in you,” he said.  
“Don’t stay with me just out of curiosity, but don’t leave me 
straight-away.” 
I moved into Tian Tian’s place, a big three-bedroom 
apartment on the western outskirts of the city.  He had 
decorated the living room simply and comfortably, with a 
sectional fabric sofa from Ikea along one wall and a Strauss 
piano.  Above the piano hung his self-portrait, in which his head 
looked as if he’d just surfaced from a pool. 
To be honest, I didn’t much like the area.  Almost all of 
the roads were full of potholes and were lined on both sides with 
cramped, shabby houses, peeling billboards, and reeking piles 
of rubbish.  Looking out of the window, I couldn’t see a single 
green tree or smartly dressed person or a clear patch of sky.  It 
was not a place where I was able to see the future. 
Saturday.  Clear weather.  Pleasant indoor temperature. 
At exactly 8:30 A.M.  I wake up, and beside me, Tian Tian 
opens his eyes.  We look at each other for a second, then begin 
to kiss silently.  Our early morning kisses are tender, 
affectionate, smooth as little fishes wriggling in water.  This is 
the compulsory start to our day – and the sole channel of sexual 
expression between us. 
Tian Tian just couldn’t handle sex.  I’m not sure if it was 
related to the tragedy that had caused his mental problems, but 
I remember the first time I held him in bed.  When I discovered 
he was impotent, I was devastated, so much so that I didn’t 
know if I could stay with him.  Ever since college I had seen sex 
as a basic necessity (although I’ve since changed my mind 
about this). 
He was kind, loving, and trusting as a dolphin.  His 
temperament was what captured my wild heart.  What he 
 108 
couldn’t give me – sharp cries or explosive pleasure, sexual 
pride or orgasm – lost significance.39 
 
 Throughout the book various friends drift in and out of Coco and Tian 
Tian’s apartment, some of them “crashing” for days or weeks at a time until 
they are ready to move on somewhere else.  Coco and Tian Tian give their 
friends a place to stay, food to eat, marijuana to smoke, and shoulders to cry 
on about their problems.  Instead of calling their families for help with the 
dilemmas they face, Tian Tian, Coco, and their friends look to each other for 
help in solving their various problems.  Their story, however, is not the only 
one that illustrates this idea of friends as family.  Mian Mian’s book, Candy, 
also vividly illustrates this type of family model.  Candy’s female protagonist, 
Hong (“Red”) lives with her boyfriend, Saining at various times throughout the 
book.  At one point while they are living together, Saining’s friend and fellow 
band member, Sanmao, moves in with them.  Sanmao is married, but for 
some undisclosed reason is not living with his wife.  He is also very 
committed to helping Saining and Hong kick their heroin habit, although he 
does not mention that to Saining or Hong as his reason for living with them.  
Later, when Hong decides to move out of Saining’s apartment, she moves in 
with his friend, Sanmao until she can decide what to do.  At a later time when 
Saining and Hong are living together they have invited two young female 
friends to live with them.  These two women are a couple, and Hong talks 
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about how she and Saining are awakened one day by the couple’s arguing 
and lovemaking: 
The two people on the other side of the wall climaxed 
simultaneously, and then we heard them singing.  Later it grew 
quiet again, and I began to feel anxious.  It was as if I could see 
them as they faced each other, their eyes locked, and I realized 
that Saining felt as agitated as I did.  It had already grown dark 
outside, and although the sight of a loving couple on Valentine’s 
Day is usually comforting, we were nagged by embarrassment.  
It was Valentine’s Day, and maybe all they wanted was to spend 
the day in bed.  For me and Saining to hang out with them like 
this had to be the height of stupidity. 
I said, ‘Let’s get dressed.  Let’s go somewhere a little 
more festive. 
And Saining said, “Good idea!  We gotta get out of here 
before they go at it again.”40 
 
Consumer culture, especially advertising, plays a tremendously large 
role in promoting the imagined reality of modern urban living in post Mao era 
China.  In the early years of post Mao economic reform, most of the television 
advertisements were for items that none of the television viewers would likely 
need, let alone be able to purchase.  Advertisements in those early years 
were for things such as dump trucks, construction equipment, and industrial 
or manufacturing components.41  Eventually television and print 
advertisements began to promote more products that would be of interest and 
within the financial reach of the urban viewing audience.  Most of the ads that 
show families are filled with the basic urban nuclear family – two adults and 
their one child – enjoying the benefits of whatever product they are marketing.  
Occasionally a grandparent slides into the scene.   
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In television and film, if the setting of the story is in a city, there are 
several items that are displayed inside the homes shown on screen as a 
matter of course, no matter how poor the family.  Every home has a 
refrigerator and a television (most likely attached to a satellite dish), and 
almost every character, to a person, carries a personal cell phone (shouji).  
Other electronics such as digital video disc (DVD) players, high-end stereos, 
flat-screen and plasma televisions, personal computers, and washing 
machines are slowly being added to that list of daily necessities that ordinarily 
appear on screen.  Advertising fuels the idea that a certain living environment, 
along with the right accoutrements, is the right and desire of all urban 
Chinese.  Regardless of the item being advertised, most of the homes shown 
in television and print advertisements are ones that have been remodeled 
inside – having tile or hardwood floors, paneled or papered walls and ceilings, 
stylish light fixtures and furniture, clean windows filled with sunlight, and in 
some cases, even carpeted floors.  One venture of the print ad genre that 
further elevates the “imagined ideal” of the modern, urban, lifestyle comes in 
the form of the weekend supplement to the popular magazine, Lifestyle.  The 
supplement is entitled Trading Up (pinwei).  It calls itself “a magazine for the 
‘new luxury’ set.”  Like its parent publication, Trading Up is a basic buyers’ 
guide.  The first issue featured reviews for brands such as Bvlgari, Gucci, 
Armani, and Tiffany.  It shows Chinese of the so-called “new luxury set” 
alongside those of the new middle class, enjoying the products it advertises.42 
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Consumer culture is not only celebrated through advertising.  Rocker 
Wei Hua, formerly of the Breathing Band (Hu Xi), lauds her modern desires 
and the consumerist mentality in her solo album “Modernization” (Xiandaihua).  
In her song “Sunday” she celebrates the cosmopolitan lifestyle she leads by 
singing about her greatest pleasures – going to restaurants like Kentucky 
Fried Chicken and Pizza Hut, or staying at home without any makeup.  In her 
song “Visa” – sung completely in English – Wei lists all the things she wants 
to do now that she has her Visa Card. 
“I just wanna hang around with my honey in hand: 
It’s OK, I just wanna learn to be cool, 
walk the streets of Rome and L.A. 
I just wanna buy a few things, coffee, cheese, books, clothes, 
perfume.”43 
Wei Hua is not the only musician cashing in on extolling the virtues of a 
pleasure-driven culture.  These lyrics from fiery female rocker Luo Qi’s (AKA 
Rose) song, “Pleasure Machine” (Kuaile jiqi) from the album of the same title 
say it all:  “Let’s turn ourselves into pleasure machines:  give me a night of 
carnival, I’ll give you a Valentine’s Day.  Turn this lonely city into a pleasure 
machine.”44  That is a far cry from the dreams of young Chinese adults just a 
decade earlier, who were hoping to go to college or find a good job above all 
else.  Now it seems that pleasure for the sake of pleasure is not as shameful 
a goal as it once had been. 
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Figure 7 
Elderly woman resting outside a Nanjing McDonalds.  (D. Buckley 2006) 
 
 
  
Another aspect of modern, urban life that has been celebrated through 
popular culture is leisure and entertainment.  During the Republican era new 
urban spaces sprang up for cosmopolitan urbanites due to higher demands 
for leisure and entertainment.  Cinema began to figure more prominently as a 
new component of the modern urban lifestyle, and renovation and 
construction of Chinese movie theaters began in the 1920s, peaking in the 
early 1930s.  The introduction of film to Chinese urban culture resulted in 
mass exposure of the urban public to many things western, from fashion, to 
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music, to western social conventions.  As a result, more Chinese began 
wearing western-style clothing and hairstyles.  Western music and social 
dancing also became widely popular, spawning numerous cabarets and 
dance halls in the late 1920s and into the late 1930s.  These new urban 
spaces brought a myriad of culture makers – entertainers, actors, musicians, 
cabaret artists, and professional dancers – onto the urban scene and into 
more intimate contact with the urban public than ever before.  These urban 
spaces provided a place where people from several different genders, 
backgrounds, and classes could mingle together in a way that they had never 
been able to before.45   
A great example from Republican era literature that melds all of these 
components of cosmopolitan urban society together is Mu Shiying’s story 
“Five People in a Nightclub” (Yezonghui li de wugeren), published in 1932.  
“Five People” is considered a “synoptic” study of the city of Shanghai, where 
the city itself is the main character, and where all of the subsequent 
characters and scenes are used to convey different aspects of life in the city, 
especially its complexity.  An excellent synopsis of the story, provided by Shi 
Shumei in her book, Lure of the Modern: Writing Modernism in Colonial China, 
follows:  
 The story begins with a depiction of five people at five 
different places at one given time, Saturday afternoon, April 6, 
1932.  A tycoon who speculates in gold loses his entire fortune 
due to the plummeting of gold prices; a college student is 
broken-hearted; a socialite modern girl is reminded of her fading 
beauty by the malicious gossip of passersby; an intellectual 
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solemnly ponders the question of identity in his room; and a 
government clerk is suddenly fired from work… Mu uses the 
method of montage, juxtaposing seemingly irrelevant events 
occurring at the same time for a combined, associational effect.   
The next section of the story entitled, “Saturday Night,” 
has no characters and no plot, but is instead a long discourse 
on what a Saturday night  in the city means.  An overdose of 
images – ice cream, nightclubs, chicken a la king, café noir, jazz, 
kiss-proof lipstick, neon lights, whiskey, chocolates, and so on – 
are juxtaposed with newspaper headlines such as –  
“Universal Benefit Realty accrued net annual interest 
totaling one-third of its capital investment – 100,000 taels” 
“Did the northeastern provinces fall?  No.  The 
northeastern provincial militia is still fighting a last-ditch battle 
against the Japs” 
“Countrymen quickly come join the Monthly Donation 
Society” 
“Continental News already sold fifty thousand copies” 
 
Mu Shiying then creates another fantastic vision of the cityscape in the next 
passage where with each cry from a newspaper boy of “Dawan Evening 
Paper!” the scene of the city around him changes.   
The first time the newspaper boy cries out the name of 
the paper, the newspaper boy opens his blue mouth, inside 
which are blue teeth and a blue tongue.  The neon high-heel 
shoe in front of him points its toe directly at his mouth.  The 
second time the newspaper boy cries out the name of the paper, 
suddenly he has a red mouth again, from which his tongue 
sticks out. The enormous neon wine bottle in front of him spills 
wine into his mouth.  Neon lights, the symbol of city nightlife, 
overwhelm the scene… 
The next section, entitled “Five Happy People,” depicts 
the five people encountering each other at the Empress 
Nightclub, all indulging in wild abandon.  The perspective of the 
section mimics the circular motion of the revolving door of the 
nightclub, moving from person to person without premeditated 
order, while the section’s language aptly captures the confusion 
of people in syncopated rhythm and disconnected images.  The 
rhythm accelerates as time runs out for these people, and at the 
end we see the gold tycoon shooting himself in the head, and 
the other people standing around and gazing at his corpse in 
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silence.   The last section then depicts the four people attending 
the tycoon’s funeral procession.”46 
 
The center of the action for most of Mu Shiying’s stories is the urban 
nightclub or dance hall.  In his story “Shanghai Foxtrot” (Shanghai hubuwu), 
he paints a scene that projects the sensations of the movement, noise, and 
the smell of the laughing people and whirling dancers inside the nightclub in 
this way: 
In the center of that smooth dancing floor are floating 
skirts and floating corners of jackets, delicate heels, heels, heels, 
heels, heels.  Undisciplined hair and men’s faces.  Men’s white 
shirt collars and women’s smiling faces.  Extended arms, jade 
earrings touching shoulders.  Round tables are in an orderly row, 
but the chairs are disorderly.  In dark corners stand waiters clad 
in white.  The smell of alcohol, the smell of perfume, the smell of 
English ham, the smell of cigarettes…47 
 
Mu Shiying’s writing is but a sample of urban-centered writing from the 
Republican era.  Many of his contemporaries such as Liu Na ‘Ou, Wu 
Nonghua, and female writers such as Lu Yin and Ding Ling have also lent 
their talents toward painting the portrait of modern urban life in Republican 
era China. 
 In this aspect of modern urban lifestyle, the popular culture of post Mao 
era China very closely mirrors that of the Republican era.  Since the mid to 
late 1980s urban in China has grown brighter with each addition of neon to 
the landscape; neon that advertises everything from karaoke bars to dance 
clubs.  An old official slogan stated, “Eight hundred million people:  eight 
hundred million soldiers.”  Now the slogan has been rendered as “One billion 
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people:  eight hundred million are gambling; two hundred million are 
dancing.”48  This saying may not be as popular today as it was even ten years 
ago, but it can still be heard occasionally on television and on the streets of 
urban China. 
 “Lower Body” writers tend to glamorize the urban venues their 
characters haunt, and paint a picture of China’s cities, swirling with movement, 
that is both beautiful and sad.  Chun Sue’s character in Beijing Doll goes to 
places like the Jackie Bar and dance clubs called The Busy Bee to see bands 
named “Cold Blooded Animals,” “Underbabies,” and “The Fly.”  She tromps all 
over Beijing with her friends, eating in fast food restaurants, checking out 
Internet cafes, and slurping Pepsi.  Chun Sue’s counterpart in Shanghai Baby, 
Coco, dresses in miniskirts and has an active social life.  She works by day as 
a waitress in the Green Stalk Café, and she frequents Shanghai’s dance 
clubs at night.  Here is a taste of one of her nights out dancing at YY’s Bar: 
YY’s has two floors.  The lower one, down a long 
staircase, houses the dance floor.  The atmosphere in the room 
was joyous, full of alcohol, perfume, money, saliva, and 
hormones. 
I saw my favorite DJ on the stand, Christopher Lee from 
Hong Kong.  When he noticed I was there, he made a face at 
me.  They were playing house and hip-hop, both totally cool, like 
a raging blind fire.  The more you danced the happier and more 
unfettered you felt, until you were vaporized out of existence 
and your right and left ear lobes were both quaking – then you 
knew you’d reached your peak. 
There were plenty of fair-haired foreigners, and lots of 
Chinese women, their tiny waistlines and silky black hair their 
selling points.  They all had a sluttish, self-promoting expression 
on their faces, but in fact a good many of them worked for 
multinational  companies.  Most were college graduates from 
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good families; some had studied abroad and owned their own 
cars.  They were the crème de la crème of Shanghai’s eight 
million women, but when they were dancing they looked tarty.  
God knew what was going on in their minds.49 
 
Mian Mian’s Candy also paints its share of glamorous and gritty scenes of 
urban life.  Following is an excerpt of Hong, the main character, describing 
her evening out at a Shanghai dance club, DD’s: 
Whenever I went to DD’s, I always sat in a high spot so 
I’d have a good view, and I watched the foreign men and the 
Shanghai girls, and there were also a lot of nice-looking 
Japanese exchange students.  Everyone was pressed together 
and dancing.  People who were tense about their jobs and 
people who were slackers all came here, and they all had empty, 
expressionless eyes, but the scent of semen was in the air.  I 
rarely danced, since I had no feel for the music here.  I liked 
underground music better – it could open up my body.  The truth 
is that the Chinese acquire an underground sensibility while 
they’re still in the womb, only nowadays everybody thinks 
they’re white-collar workers. 
Everywhere you look you see mirrors and red velvet.  
That night Kiwi sat with me the whole time, watching.  There 
were too many people, the air was terrible, and Kiwi kept on 
fanning me with a fan. 
When it was time to go home, Kiwi said, “Let’s go to your 
place tonight!”  We walked down the street, and Kiwi said, “This 
town is too silly.  At any hour of the day you can find all kinds of 
people in the street just doing their thing.”  I said, “The Bund is 
nice, but there are so many homeless people hiding out there 
that it makes me feel funny.”50 
In one of the grittier scenes from the book Hong talks about a prostitute she 
met in Guangdong Province named Little Shanghai.  Little Shanghai was 
taken to Guangdong by her boyfriend and forced into prostitution.  Hong 
attempts to paint for her readers a picture of Little Shanghai’s world: 
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Every night we watched her riding the hotel elevator, up 
and down, up and down.  There was an illegal gambling parlor 
in the hotel basement, and where there’s gambling, there are 
prostitutes.  It’s a custom in Guangdong:  when you’re done 
gambling, win or lose, you call a prostitute.  Otherwise it’s bad 
luck.  Little Shanghai in the elevator, a condom hidden in her 
underwear, kept a running tally in her head.  Each john was 
equal to five hundred yuan.  She  had a good feel for numbers, 
but money left her cold, and after every trick she went back to 
the room she hared with her boyfriend-pimp (laogong) and 
turned the money over to him.  She never saved any money. 
That elevator was her world, and I remember it as the 
window on her life.  She always wore a red short-sleeved wool 
sweater; she called it her uniform.  She would stand in the 
corner of the elevator, right by the buttons, as if she were the 
elevator girl.  Her eyes communicated an innocent desire.  
Fixing a man in the elevator with those black eyes, she might 
ask, “Do you want to do business?”  Some of them wouldn’t look 
at her, but some of them did, not that she cared much either 
way.  Sometimes a man would come straight over to her and 
start feeling her up, squeezing her small, firm, breasts, reaching 
inside her pants…  Every man who touched Little Shanghai in 
the elevator was hurried and anxious, and every man who 
looked at her had a rapacious gleam in his eyes.  Little 
Shanghai always smiled at this, figuring that the men liked the 
way she looked as she leaned against the wall of the elevator 
and smiled.51 
While authors of the “Lower Body” genre paint their own version of the 
cityscape of urban culture, no culture maker of the post Mao era has done 
more to illustrate urban life in China than Wang Shuo.  Wang Shuo is a 
Beijing author who, through his writing, has tapped into the realities of life in 
contemporary urban China.  He is a prolific author who has written over 
twenty novels, numerous television scripts, and several screenplays.  
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Considered the “father of the alternative literature movement” that began in 
the late 1980s and continues to the present, he gave voice to an entire group 
of people – the emergent class of disenfranchised urban dwellers who were 
pushed, or willingly chose to go, to the margins of Chinese urban society in 
the wake of economic reform.  (These disenfranchised urbanites will be 
studied more closely in chapter four on sub cultures.)  Most of his books, such 
as Playing for Thrills (Wande jiu shi xintiao) and Please Don’t Call Me Human 
(Qianwan bie ba wo dang ren), are set in the underbelly of China’s urban 
centers.  They are populated by a cast of colorful characters – con artists, 
jobless drifters, underworld types and quick-witted smart-asses – all of whom 
qualify for the Chinese Communist Party’s catch-all label of “hoodlum,” thus 
spawning a new literary genre known as pizi wenxue or “hoodlum literature.”52  
The free-wheeling spirits he celebrates in his writing are lumped together in 
the same social category by virtue of their rejection of mainstream culture and 
mutual lack of involvement in any social or political causes. 
 Probably the most popular of his works is the television series he wrote 
called Stories of and Editorial Board (Bianjibu de gushi) which aired in 1991.  
Stories is a groundbreaking program in Chinese television because it is 
China’s first sitcom.  The twenty-five-part comedy series revolves around the 
staff members of a magazine of mediocre quality with the pompous name, 
Guide to the World of Man (Renjian zhinan).   The show’s basic recipe is this:  
“smart-asses giving out advice to others and more often than not bringing 
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trouble upon themselves or upon their clients.”  Wang’s writing partner on the 
series, Feng Xiaogang, describes the sketches in each episode as “harmless 
fun, without any social critique that just touch on social things, without dealing 
with the system.”  The show has a universal appeal because it talks about 
everyday city folk with everyday problems.  The characters in the show spend 
most of their time acting as social counselors for one another and their clients 
– helping someone find a wife, settling family disputes, helping a fat man lose 
weight, etc.  The strange solutions they devise to these problems keep the 
stories interesting, along with the hilarious verbal exchanges between the 
staff members.  The funny cross-talks exploit gender and generational 
differences as well as differences in worldview and ideology.  Most of the 
ideological differences occur between a very “red” older female staff member 
who still adheres to the ways of the Party and two younger male staff 
members who are of no particular ideological bent.  Wang Shuo’s Stories of 
an Editorial Board appeal to such a large audience because of the ordinary, 
everyday flavor of the scenes of urban life it portrays.  The novels of the 
“Lower Body” writers also appeal to a fairly large audience (though not as 
large an audience as that of Stories), because of the very shocking scenes of 
urban life they portray.  Watchers of Stories of an Editorial Board identify with 
what they see in the show, so they know it is real, while readers of Candy, 
Shanghai Baby, and Beijing Doll, whether or not they can identify with what 
 121 
they read, the fact that such a world exists in China’s cities becomes more 
real to them the more they read this type of writing.53 
 This chapter examined identity messages about cosmopolitanism most 
commonly seen through the urban popular cultures of the Republican and 
post Mao eras.  It is not meant to be a comparison between Lu Xun and 
Wang Shuo, or Ding Ling and Mian Mian.  It is, however, an examination of 
general principles, or messages, that various works of popular culture during 
both periods of China’s history promoted about cosmopolitanism.  The 
method of transmission of the messages or the messages themselves may 
not be identical, but clearly the urban popular cultures of the Republican and 
post Mao eras both celebrate the principles that it is important to be a global 
citizen, that part of being a global citizen means enlarging the context in 
which you live your life, and that it engenders the responsibility to tolerate 
several points of view other than your own – regardless of the issue.  Now 
that the basic pop culture identity messages on individualism (from chapter 
two) and cosmopolitanism have been laid out, they will help provide a deeper 
context for Chapter four, which examines some of the more conspicuous 
identity types celebrated in the popular culture of both eras. 
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Chapter 4 
Celebrated Identity Types 
 
Ironically, pop culture makers from both the Republican and post Mao 
eras, while taking advantage of an urban climate that has allowed for greater 
plurality and individual expression, have often fallen prey to the need to define 
their characters to the point of rendering them somewhat common, at least on 
some basic level, amongst the other characters of pop culture works.  Even in 
the midst of increasing plurality there is still conformity.  When surveying a 
variety of the works from the pop culture of both eras there are certain 
identities or “types” that appear over and over with some frequency.  These 
identities are based upon general categories of people mixing in the urban 
milieu of each time period.  They all break the rules and test the limits of 
mainstream culture, but often in similar ways.  The details about the other 
characters’ backgrounds and the specific setting may be all that differentiates 
them.  Undoubtedly they are a superficial yet fairly accurate reflection of a 
generally recognized demographic, a type of person one would actually 
encounter in the urban China of each era – recognizable by their outward 
appearance (or “uniform”) and by their demeanor, attitudes, and personality 
as part of one of those general demographics.  The ones featured in this 
chapter a sampling of some of the most notable identity types.  Some are 
gender-specific, such as the “modern woman,” the “playgirl,” the “sexually 
promiscuous and confident woman,” the “modern female student,” the 
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“virtuous prostitute,” the “gold digger,” and the male literatus, or wen ren, to 
name a few.  Those identity types featured in this chapter that are not 
specifically gendered are the “anti hero,” the “decadent social rebel,” the 
“tragic hero or heroine,” and the “cultural celebrity.”  Each of these identity 
types may be represented in popular culture in a number of variations, but 
regardless of the variation, the theme of the basic stereotype still shines 
through. 
One of the most pervasive identities celebrated in the urban popular 
culture of both eras has been the Modern Woman.  The label of “modern 
woman,” became a catch-all for any female who did not fit the traditional mold 
of a woman of that period or possibly of the period just prior to the one in 
which she lived.  The label not only included certain attitudes and character 
traits, but it also included a physical description that allowed one, at a glance, 
to identify that he was indeed dealing with a modern woman.  During the 
Republican era there were three prevalent “uniforms” that a modern urban 
Chinese woman could adopt – the qipao or split skirt, the student, and the 
Western woman.  The qipao as a “uniform” of the modern woman was 
devised by altering the robe of a Manchu banner man into a “split skirt” style 
of dress.  The length of the sleeves, the length of the skirt, and the height of 
the slit were the main components of this new “uniform” that were altered to fit 
the individual wearer.  Other features of this uniform could include high-
heeled shoes, nude or flesh-colored stockings (preferably silk), shoulder-
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length or shorter hair set in a permanent wave, and stark makeup that might 
include white face powder, thin, long, drawn-on eyebrows, and blood-colored 
lips.   This “uniform” of the modern woman has also been called the “Chinese 
flapper” look.  It was widely popularized through advertising and periodical 
images and celebrated as the height of style.1   
The “student uniform” is the style the author Ding Ling may have 
adopted when she audited classes taught by Lu Xun in the early 1920s.  This 
style was anchored by the requisite long black skirt that fell well below the 
knee.  The skirt was topped with a jacket, usually long-sleeved, in the style of 
a traditional scholar’s gown.  It came to the hip, had a slit up each side, and 
was usually worn buttoned to the stand up collar of the neck (mandarin 
collar?).  Any type of blouse may have been worn under the jacket, but was 
usually not revealed.  Black or nude colored stockings worn with sensible 
shoes completed the outfit.  The hair was most likely bobbed, also with a 
permanent wave, and very little make up was worn, except for a light dusting 
of white facial powder.  The student “uniform” for the modern Chinese woman 
is also described in this quote from Leo Lee’s book, The Romantic Generation 
of Modern Chinese Writers:  
Her hair has been cut by half. To her loose short hair is 
fastened an ivory butterfly (ribbon).  Her breasts inside her 
snow-white gauze shirt are very flat; obviously she is wearing a 
tight brassier… Under her short and open black silk skirt is a 
pair of short legs in white silk stockings.  Further down are her 
daring high-heeled leather shoes, which make her limbs wave 
and writhe when she walks.  The short hair and flat breasts 
were the typical features of independent, emancipated girl 
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rebels who were taken by the general public for “female 
revolutionaries” (nu geming) because the short hair was 
supposedly introduced from Soviet Russia.  The outward 
appearance was very much a part of the Nora Culture (referring 
to the protagonist of Henrik Ibsen’s play, A Doll’s House). 
 
As university students or teachers in secondary schools, they would, on their 
own initiative, daringly befriend and visit young literary men.  Chinese 
literature of the 1920s was full of stories of how an independent Nora would 
meet and flirt with a pensive and pale young writer or painter.2 
The Western woman “uniform” for the modern Chinese woman is best 
described in a short story by Republican era author Liu Na’Ou called “Games” 
(Youxi).  In it Liu’s heroine is described as a “masculinized and athletic 
modern woman.  She is slightly tan, with strong limbs, short bobbed hair, a 
‘Greek’ nose, and a small cherry mouth.  She wore sheer stockings, high 
heels, and usually a brightly colored one-piece dress in the fashion of 
American film idols such as Mary Pickford or Gloria Swanson.”  Regardless of 
the specifics of the particular “uniform” of the modern, urban Chinese woman, 
she was usually described as “bold, direct, and unrestrained in her behavior.”  
If she wanted to smoke, she smoked.  If she wanted to drink alcohol, she 
drank.  By her clothing, her attitudes, and her behavior she marked herself as 
one who flaunts tradition and who makes a way for herself in the world. 3  
Other than her particular “uniform,” the mark of the modern girl is found in the 
independence and autonomy with which she exercises her own agency as 
she walks through life – especially with regard to her sexuality.4  More often 
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than not the “modern woman” of Republican era and post Mao era pop 
culture is very aware of her sexuality, knows how to use it to her advantage, 
or wants to explore it.   
The modern female student as a celebrated identity type in the 
Republican era did not fit into a narrowly defined age group, as women of a 
variety of ages began to take advantage of new educational opportunities.  
However, the majority of those celebrated through works of popular culture 
did fit a generally recognized demographic – they were in their late teens and 
early twenties, they were hungry for knowledge, and they were eager to exert 
their independence.  One of the most famous modern female students of that 
era is Ding Ling’s Miss Sophie.  In this excerpt from the end of her diary, she 
allows us to glimpse her true feelings about the young man with whom she 
has been infatuated and the thought process that leads to her decision to 
leave Beijing for the South, where she plans to live out her final days: 
Oh dear!  What kind of words or emotions should I repent 
with? You, Ling Jishi, a man as contemptible as you, kissed me. 
And meekly and quietly I let you. But when that warm, moist soft 
thing was on my face what was my heart getting? I would never 
swoon like some women in the arms of their lovers. I was 
looking at him, my eyes wide open, thinking, "I've won! I've 
won!"  It was because when he kissed me I knew the taste of 
what it was that bewitched me, and at the same time I despised 
myself. That's why I -suddenly felt miserable, pushed him away 
and started crying.  
"…Why do you have to expose all your appalling side?" I 
really began to feel sorry for him again.   
"Don't you get any wild ideas," I said. "I might be dead 
tomorrow."   
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Goodness only knows what impact my words had on him. 
He kissed me again but I evaded him, and his lips landed on my 
hand. 
My mind was made up. My mind was clear enough for 
me to insist that he went. He looked rather disgruntled and 
wouldn't leave me alone. "Why are you being so stubborn?" I 
wondered. He didn't go till 12:30 a.m.   
When he'd left I thought about what had just happened. I 
wanted to hit my heart hard, with all my strength. Why did I let a 
man I despise so much kiss me? I don't love him and I was 
jeering at him, but why did I let him embrace me?  
Fortunately my life is mine alone in all the universe to 
play with. I've already wasted enough of it. It doesn't seem' to be 
a matter of any importance that this experience has thrown me 
into the very depths of grief. 
But I refuse to stay in Beijing, let alone go to the Western 
Hills. I've decided to take the train south to waste what's left of 
my life where nobody knows me, and as a result my wounded 
heart has perked up. I'm laughing wildly with self-pity.5 
 
Sophie admits to herself (and to us through her diary) that she has persuaded 
herself to allow Ling Jishi to kiss her because of his good looks.  Despite her 
slip in judgment, she still believes she knows what is best for her and how she 
wishes to spend her final days.  She does not mention that she is going to 
consult with her family or her doctor about whether or not it would be good for 
her to leave Beijing.  She makes the decision on her own. 
To a modern female student of the post Mao era Sophie’s indiscretion 
with Ling Jishi may seem hardly an indiscretion at all.   Most of the students 
portrayed in post Mao era popular culture exhibit the independence of those 
celebrated in Republican era literature at a considerably younger age.  While 
Ding Ling’s Sophie considered herself blatantly modern for considering the 
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possibility of a romantic liaison with a gorgeous young man she’d met and 
with whom she had become infatuated, Beijing Doll’s main character, Chun 
Sue, at the younger age of fourteen pursues relationships with older men and 
displays an almost blasé attitude toward her sexual encounters with them, 
some of whom she barely knows.  In this excerpt from the book, Chun Sue 
speaks about meeting “G,” the lead singer of a band she likes, and on 
particular night they spent together: 
One night G and I sneaked into his room.  My heart was 
racing.  At first we logged onto the computer and got into a chat 
room, where we said things like, “How come everybody in 
here’s a moron?”  Then G played his guitar for awhile, until he 
looked over at me and said, “Let’s take a bath.” 
“Bathe…to…gether?” 
“Why not?” he said.  We tiptoed into the bathroom.  
Standing back-to-back, we took off our clothes, but when we 
turned around, we didn’t dare look at anything but each other’s 
face.  The water came in fits and starts.  G told me that’s how it 
always is in single-story buildings.  After we’d washed up awhile 
he gently said, “I’ll rub shower gel on you.”  Stirred by an 
excitement ‘I’d never felt before, I turned and stared at his 
skinny, childish body, and we wrapped our arms around each 
other. 
Back on his bed, we whispered as we looked through 
some comic books.  I put on a Cure CD, just the right thing for a 
night filled with fantasies and texture – warm music, making 
everything just perfect.  We lay back quietly and held hands.  He 
gently kissed me on the eyes and on the lips. 
“I,think… I think I want you…” 
“Hm?  What did you say?... Okay, sure,” I said casually. 
“I, I want you, you’re mine, mine alone.”  He sounded 
very determined. 
His alone?  I’d never consider “belonging” to someone, 
not to anyone. 
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So, I told him how I felt about such things, sort of 
stammering as I did it.  He sighed but didn’t say anything.  He 
just held me tight.  By then it was already close to two in the 
morning.  We set the alarm clock for 4:30 so that we could be 
out of there before G’s folks woke up.6 
 
It is hard to imagine Chun Sue, a fourteen-year-old middle school student in 
Beijing, as being more sexually experienced than a twenty-year-old university 
student in Shanghai, but this middle school student lived in post Mao era 
China, while the twenty-something university student lived in Republican era 
China.  However, in their own ways, they are both examples of young women 
living outside the realm of what was generally considered to be respectable 
behavior.  What concerns both of these students is not how society will judge 
their behavior or their attitudes, but what each young woman thinks of herself.  
That each relies on her own conscience as the standard by which she 
measures her behavior (and not society’s collective conscience) is a telling 
measure of how independent each of them truly is. 
Yet another identity type that frequently appears in the popular cultures 
of both eras is that of the playgirl.  The playgirl is usually a sexually confident 
woman who may take many forms; she may be a femme fatale, a wanton and 
promiscuous woman, or even a “sexual feminist” who takes the initiative in 
the sexual pursuit.  Mu Shiying’s heroine in his story “The Man Who is 
Treated as a Plaything” (Bei dangzuo xiaoqianpin de nanzi) embodies all 
three. Her name is Rongzi, and she is so sexually assured and aggressive 
that the protagonist, Alexy, is alternately afraid of her and attracted to her.  
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Alexy describes her by saying “she has a snake’s body, a cat’s head, a 
mixture of softness and danger,” and as having “a lying mouth and a pair of 
cheating eyes.”  Despite the negative images his description conjures, Alexy 
also appears to admire Rongzi for her wit and her confidence.  Rongzi 
pursues Alexy, seduces him, and makes him believe that he is her only lover.  
However, Alexy discovers he is but one of many lovers who help to satisfy 
Rongzi’s sexual appetite.  Even when he knows she continues to lie to him, 
Alexy succumbs to Rongzi’s overtures because he is intoxicated with her 
body and the way she makes him feel.  He allows her to use him as her 
sexual “plaything” until one day she simply disappears from his life.  He is 
bewildered even though she had told him over and over that she is not a one 
man kind of woman, “Do you think a woman can be adored by only one man?  
Love is for the One, but I can have many playthings.”  The most ironic aspect 
of the story is that this “dangerous and terrifying” woman turns out to be a 
university student by day who frequents night clubs and dance halls by night.  
It an odd way, Mu Shiying’s character, Rongzi, is a Republican era example 
of a playgirl and a modern student.7 
A variation on the sexually promiscuous modern woman in Republican 
era popular culture is the virtuous prostitute; the victim of social injustice who 
makes good.  A real life example came out of the 1920s Chinese film, “A 
Woman in Shanghai.”  The protagonist of the film is a young girl from the 
country who is sold into prostitution.  The character was played by a young 
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woman by the name of Xuan Jingling who, herself, was a young prostitute in 
her teens at the time she acted in the film.  She gained enough notoriety and 
earned money from her work on the movie that she was able to buy herself 
out of prostitution.  She lived in Shanghai until she died in 1992 at the age of 
eighty-five.8 
Post Mao era popular culture is rife with playgirls of all shapes, sizes, 
and persuasions.  In The People’s Republic of Desire, the narrator speaks of 
one of her friends, May May, a sexually aggressive young woman who 
sounds very similar to Mu Shiying’s terrifyingly tantalizing seductress, Rongzi: 
China has been a conformist society for too long.  
Perhaps that explains why the new generations want to be 
different.  They defy conformity by breaking the rules and testing 
the limits.  But sometimes, they not only challenge the rules set 
by Chinese standards, but by Western standards as well. 
May May is such a rule-breaker.  She doesn’t believe in 
the existence of limits.  She has many hobbies, one of which is 
sleeping with middle-aged MBAs – men who are married but 
available. 
She tells me about her theory in a hot-pot restaurant.  
“Young men are like grapes and middle-aged men are like wine.  
Their bellies may grow bigger, and the number of hairs on their 
heads may grow less, but they are more attractive; they make 
me feel intoxicated. 
 “Middle-aged men tend to be more generous in bed than 
younger men, who often don’t want to control their desires.  
Middle-aged men tend to be more successful financially.  They 
can buy you expensive gifts, whereas young boys can only send 
you flowers or a box of chocolates.  Since middle-aged men 
have been around, and they have more status and more 
networks, they can help you with your career.  They also 
understand women and know very well how to please us.”  May 
May speaks as if she is giving a lecture at a university. 
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I say, “Well, what you say might explain why you love 
middle-aged men, but it doesn’t explain why you always go out 
with the married ones.” 
May May laughs.  “Don’t you think that middle-aged 
MBAs are a more desirable group than those who are still 
single?” 
May May continues with a smile.  “Our parents’ 
generation is the generation of obedience.  They have followed 
the rules and never enjoyed themselves.  I like to live on the 
edge.  I like to sleep with married men because the thrill of 
stealing makes the sex even more exciting!  It’s so cool to do it 
in their own bedrooms during the day when their wives are at 
work.” 
“In the same bed that they share with their wives?  Not a 
motel or something?  Don’t you think it’s an intrusion into the 
wives’ territory?”  I can’t stop sounding a bit judgmental. 
“That’s exactly the point.  I am like an invader.  Society 
encourages us to be competitive!  I hate losing.  It feels so good 
that these smart men are willing to betray their women and 
come to me.  It’s called charm.” 
“Do you think they like you because you’re so 
irresistible?” I ask. 
“Well, I’m a modern liberal woman.  I can give them the 
level of passion that their wives can’t.  In return, I get the 
uninhibited, carnal sex that I want,” May May says proudly.9 
 
May May, through her fascination with middle-aged MBAs and the ever-
increasing notches on her lipstick case, displays the attitude of the huntress; 
she sees herself as a feminist and refers to the men she meets for one-night-
stands as conquests.  She is adamant that she does not want any emotional 
entanglements with these men and insists that her encounters remain strictly 
sexual.  In many ways she seems to have adopted an approach to sex that is 
traditionally seen as male – unashamed of her desires, she sets out to get as 
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much enjoyment out of sex as she can without any responsibility or long-term 
commitment.  She is not only an example of a playgirl, but also of a feminist.  
It is not enough for her to experience sex with as many men as possible.  She 
wants to exercise her right to brag about it. 
Another form of the playgirl that appears frequently in the popular 
culture of the post Mao era is the gold digger – a woman who openly looks for 
a rich man to keep her in the style to which she has grown accustomed.  In 
another excerpt from The People’s Republic of Desire, the main character 
encounters two young women, Ding Dong and Ah-Fei, who explain how they 
plan to capture wealthy husbands: 
I ask Ding Dong, “What jobs do the two of you have that 
allow you to acquire such a nice collection of expensive 
cosmetics?” 
“We’re antique appraisers,” she says proudly. 
“Fashionable young women like you, why are you antique 
appraisers?”  I humor them. 
“In our business, we have a high-class clientele, either 
foreign, Taiwanese, or Hong Kong businessmen,” Ding Dong 
smugly replies.  “They’re good candidates for spouses.” 
“So they give you these gifts for free?” 
“Yes.  If they want our honest comments on the antiques 
they have.” 
“Do you like the job?” 
“It’s a good way to meet men of quality.”  Ding Dong 
smiles. 
“Are you guys bang dakuan, gold diggers?”  I ask bluntly, 
waiting for their reaction. 
“What’s wrong with being a gold digger?  All we want is a 
good husband.”  Ding Dong doesn’t mind being called bang 
dakuan. 
“What is considered a good husband?”  I am curious 
what their definition is. 
 136 
“A good husband should be tall and wealthy.  He should 
come from overseas,”  Ah-Fei cuts in. 
“What do you mean by wealthy?”  My fieldwork 
continues. 
“If you talk about possessions, they have to have the 
three C’s:  condo, car and credit card,” says Ding Dong. 
“Four C’s are even better!” Ah-Fei cuts in again. 
“What is the fourth C?” 
“CEO!” 
Her answer reminds me of the popular new rhyme:  
“First-class girls marry the Americans; second-class girls marry 
the Japanese; third-class girls marry the Taiwanese or Hong 
Kongers; fourth-class girls marry the mainlanders. 
“How can you attract such wealthy men?” I ask. 
“First, we study foreign languages…” 
“Okay, then what else?” 
Ding Dong continues, “We learn to cook Chinese food 
and some other Chinese tricks like playing the Chinese flute or 
doing calligraphy. Men, Chinese or foreign, like women who can 
be both domestic and cultural.” 
“What about college education?” 
“No.  We don’t have any college education,” Ding Dong 
shakes her head. 
“Do you admire the girls in Tsinghua then?” 
“No way!  We don’t want to become nerds with Coke-
bottle glasses.  Instead of studying calculus, out textbook is 
How to Snare a Millionaire!” Ding Dong says.10 
 
As with May May in the first excerpt from the book, Ding Dong and Ah-Fei 
openly admit what they want above all else, and that they are willing to do 
whatever they must to get it.  At one point in the conversation the main 
character asks them what they think of the young women who study at nearby 
Qinghua University.  The two laugh derisively at the “eggheads” who pursue 
academic and career ambitions, as if those young women are cute, but naïve.   
The gold digger is one identity type that is especially evident on the 
urban streets of post Mao China, not just on the page or on the screen.  
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Practically wherever one sees a wealthy gentleman, one will inevitably see a 
bevy of young beautiful women vying for his attention, regardless of the 
quality of his other charms.  Because the generation who grew up as only 
children is reaching adulthood, the male to female ratio is tilted in favor of the 
females, and those who want financial security or a high-priced lifestyle have 
supplanted the doe-eyed, romance-inspired identity type of the pop culture 
works of the late 1970s and early 1980s as the protagonists and would-be 
heroines.  Not all celebrated identity types of urban pop culture are the heroes 
of their own story. 
Several identity types in pop culture are not as specifically gendered as 
those discussed above.  One popular identity type with culture makers from 
both eras that falls into this category is the anti hero, especially after the 
success of Lu Xun’s story about the ultimate anti hero in The True Story of Ah 
Q (1921).  Ah Q is depicted as a selfish, cowardly, and cunning man who is 
capable of amazing self-deception.  In the end he is shot for being a 
revolutionary even though he is not.  He is only guilty of bragging about being 
one.11  Lu Xun portrays Ah Q as a man who is not in touch with reality; one 
who lives in the fantasy world of his own mind and who finds a way to turn 
every insult and every blow to himself (physical and emotional) as proof that 
he belongs to a group, that he is surrounded by the community of all humanity 
who all suffer just as badly as he.  His self-deception begins with his overly 
exalted opinion of himself.  Though he is an illiterate day laborer who sleeps 
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like a homeless man in the Tutelary God’s Temple, he finds endless ways to 
display the most patronizing and condescending attitude toward the people of 
his village. 
Ah Q, again, had a very high opinion of himself.  He 
looked down on all the inhabitants of Weizhuang, thinking even 
the two young “scholars” not worth a smile, though most young 
scholars were likely to pass the official examinations.  Mr. Zhao 
and Mr. Qian were held in great respect by the villagers, for in 
addition to being rich they were both the fathers of young 
scholars.  Ah Q alone showed them no exceptional deference, 
thinking to himself, “My sons may be much greater.”12 
 
Although Ah Q has seen revolutionaries decapitated and has 
concluded that any revolutionary rebellion would make life difficult for him, he 
begins to admire the way rumors of local revolutionary activity strike fear into 
the heart of one of the successful provincial candidates.  As he begins to 
fantasize about being a revolutionary himself, and about how all of the people 
in his village of Weizhuang are his captives, he unwittingly begins to set the 
stage for his own demise by randomly shouting things such as, “Rebellion!  
Rebellion!”13 and idly talking about revolution in the abstract saying, “Revolt?  
It would be fine… A troop of revolutionaries would come, all in white helmets 
and white armor, with swords, steel maces, bombs, foreign guns, sharp-
pointed double-edged knives, and spears with hooks.  When they passed this 
temple they would call out ‘Ah Q!  Come along with us!’  And then I would go 
with them…”14  Even when he is questioned at the yamen about his 
revolutionary activities he is all but unaware of the danger he is in, and all he 
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can do is express his indignation that the revolution that occurred in the 
village had taken place without him and that the revolutionaries had not let 
him join them.  By the time he realizes he is being led away in a cart to have 
his head cut off his initial fright melts into calm as “It seemed to him that in 
this world probably it was the fate of everybody at some time to have his head 
cut off.”15  Then when he is being paraded around the public streets of the 
village as a public example, even though he does not realize it, the author fills 
in for us what he believed Ah Q’s thoughts about this would be “… that in this 
world probably it was the fate of everybody at some time to be made a public 
example of.”16  The last image of him with which we are left is his own 
shame… at his “lack of spirit” as he is being led to the execution ground.  To 
make a show of his spirit he considers what opera would be most appropriate 
for him to sing.  He only gets the first half of a famous line of opera out of his 
mouth as he shouts, “In twenty years I shall be another…,” leaving off the end 
of the line “stout young fellow,” which he does not know. 17   
The story was so popular and so universally received, that “Ah Q-ism” 
became a phrase that was added to the Chinese lexicon in the 1920s.  It is a 
term that is still used today, and characterizes the Chinese tendency to ignore 
reality and rationalize any defeat as a “spiritual victory.”18  Lu Xun despised 
the Ah Q-like tendencies of the Chinese psyche, and set out, through his 
fictional characters, to illuminate for his readers the very real attitudes and 
actions he found particularly ugly among his fellow Chinese.  He said, “My 
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method is to make the reader unable to tell who this character can be apart 
from himself so that he cannot back away to become a bystander but rather 
suspects that this is a portrait of himself as well as of all other Chinese.” 
The post Mao era equivalent of the anti hero is deftly illustrated in 
Wang Shuo’s novella “Troublemakers” (Wanzhu), his first work to ever make 
it to film.  The anti hero in this satire is not a specific character, but more 
ethereal.  It includes anyone who displays a mindset the main characters find 
exceptionally ridiculous – for example, the ideologues of Chinese society who 
believe that their own ideology, whatever it is, is the only right one, and that 
they are better than those who do not subscribe to the same beliefs.  The 
story is about three young entrepreneurs who concoct an entertaining way to 
make money.  They act as surrogates for their clients – substituting their 
actual bodies and their own witty banter in place of their clients’ to achieve 
some otherwise unattainable goal on behalf of their client.  The name of their 
company, the “Three Ts,” is a play on the Chinese word for substitute (daiti de 
ti), and refers to each of them as surrogates and to the three areas of service 
that they offer their clients:  general troubleshooting; tedium relief; and taking 
the blame.   
One of the company’s clients, a young pulp fiction writer named Zhi 
Qing, desperately wants to win a literary prize.  So, the three entrepreneurs 
organize a mock awards ceremony for him.  The event is a total mockery of 
the literary institution in China.  The entrepreneurs arrange for phony writers 
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to read their “poems” to the audience.  One such phony writer is a woman 
who is supposedly from the “Misty” school – an underground school of poetry 
known for its obscure complexity.  She stands in front of the audience staring 
at them, then takes her long hair and places it on one side of her body, 
simultaneously reciting in an impassive voice, “People say this side of me is 
the Yangzi River.”  She then proceeds to place her hair on the opposite side 
of her body, ending her performance with, “People also say this side of me is 
the Yellow River.”  The crowd breaks into thunderous applause, and it is 
evident (especially in the film version) that the entire enterprise is one large 
spoof of all those things Chinese television unflaggingly shows –  namely, 
people giving endless speeches and evening galas (wanhui) reminiscent of 
variety shows from 1970s American television.  Once all of the phony speech-
givers finish fawning over Zhi Qing (the client) and the absurd poems are all 
read to the audience, the scene morphs into a frenetic fashion show gone 
wrong.  The stage is filled with people from all walks of life dancing to the beat 
of disco music that jumbles different historical periods and political climates 
together. – workers dancing with peasants and female bodybuilders, traffic 
policemen dancing with old-Shanghai prostitutes, Eighth Army and 
Kuomintang (KMT) soldiers dancing together, clowns and literati from 
Chinese opera dancing with students from the May Fourth (1919) era and red 
guards from the Cultural Revolution, and pretty fashion models dancing 
around a bride dressed in white.   
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The three main characters in “Troublemakers” are not pointing their 
fingers at anyone or trying to lay blame by any stretch of the imagination.  
Indeed, the attitude they project is summed up in their own words:  “We can 
stand anything because we know there’s nothing perfect, everywhere is the 
same.  We have no expectations, no recriminations,” and “If you don’t rely on 
anything, then you don’t care about anything.”  Through the thoroughly 
dismissive attitude and ambivalence the main characters project, and the 
entertaining way in which they do so, “Troublemakers” makes it clear that the 
joke is on anyone who would try to convince them to believe other than they 
do, or those who believe passionately about anything at all.  Those with an 
agenda, who rely on something or someone else for their strength or who 
expect something from life, are the ones who come off looking unrealistic and 
sad, not our main characters.19 
The anti hero appears all over the landscape of Chinese popular 
culture, and is an effective device for pointing the laser of revelation at the 
types of people and attitudes the culture maker wants to lampoon by painting 
such characters in hyperbolic absurdity or by showing the contrasting 
characters in such a good light as to make those who display contrary ideas 
look ridiculous by comparison.  Lu Xun and his post Mao era counterpart, 
Wang Shuo, are both masterful writers of the anti hero. 
Another identity type featured in the popular cultures of both eras is the 
decadent social rebel whose hedonism and wanton pursuit of pleasure brings 
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his downfall or even early death.  The decadent rebel was not only 
immortalized in fiction, but he was also evident in the lifestyle of some of the 
very culture makers who glorified him on the page.  Celebrated author Yu 
Dafu, himself an icon of Republican era culture, was a writer who believed 
that all literature was basically autobiography, and most of his stories reflect 
that belief.  He wrote favorably of the experience of premature death among 
decadent British writers, pointing to that as an emblem of their complete and 
utter rebellion against conventional morality and a civilization that had been 
built upon such notions.  In 1923 Yu was quoted as saying, “Life is but the 
crystallization of sadness and bitterness.  I do not believe that happiness 
exists.  People accuse me of being a decadent, a hedonist, but they do not 
know the reasons behind my pursuit of wine and sex.  Ah, waking up from 
deep drinking on a clear night, looking at the money-bought body sleeping 
near my chest, my melancholy and my laments are many times deeper and 
more painful than those of the self-appointed moralists.”20  His short story, 
“Sinking,” is considered by scholars as the genesis of decadent literature in 
modern China.  It is the story of a frustrated and lonely Chinese student living 
in Japan who attempts to relieve is frustration by engaging in nightly 
masturbation.  Because the resultant relief he finds is fleeting, he ends up 
drowning himself at sea.  Most literary critics of the time denounced Yu as 
immoral and as an advocate for “self-abuse.”  Only one critic, fellow writer 
Zhou Zuoren, who declared “Sinking” a “work of art” that contained nothing 
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immoral, though it could possibly be considered amoral.  He continued his 
analysis:  “It seems more correct to say that what is described in this 
collection, ‘Sinking,’ is the common agony of youth.  The conflict between the 
will to live and reality is the source of all agony.  Discontented with reality and 
yet unwilling to escape into emptiness, man can only continue to seek 
unattainable pleasure and happiness in this hard and cold reality.  This is 
what makes the sorrow of modern man different from that of the romantic 
period.”21  Yu Dafu’s fiction attempted to lay bare those things of the private 
self that were traditionally repressed by most Chinese writers, such as anxiety, 
despair, guilt, sexual desire, insecurity, alienation, and paranoia.   In a 1923 
quote about his writing, Yu Dafu said, “My heart is thus inclined, to discharge 
myself once and for all of the sin of insincerity, I can only reveal my inner self 
in all its nakedness.”22 
Gu Zongqi is one Chinese writer who embraced the same decadent 
style of Yu Dafu in his own writing.  He and other writers like him who were 
influenced by Yu entertained the notion that death would be the ultimate relief 
from a painful and purposeless existence.  In 1923 Gu was quoted as saying, 
“Now I can understand the meaning of the word death.  Death is pleasurable, 
death is grand.  Justice for the oppressed lies in the word death.  When I die, 
I return this entirely un-free soul to its original state of freedom.”  Suicide 
attempts and “successes,” preoccupations with death and suicide, and mental 
and nervous breakdowns marked the lives of such decadent writers.  Gu 
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Zongqi fulfilled his ultimate “pleasure” by committing suicide at the age of 
twenty-six.23 
Post Mao era equivalents of the decadent social rebel abound in 
literature as well as in the real life exploits of some of China’s high profile 
culture makers.  The author-turned-nightlife promoter, Mian Mian, straddles 
literature and real life through her semi-autobiographical book, Candy.  The 
life of her protagonist, a young woman named Hong, is loosely based on Mian 
Mian herself.  Both chose unconventional life paths, both moved between life 
in Shanghai and Shenzhen, both are writers, both have struggled with 
depression and have made failed suicide attempts, and both are recovering 
drug addicts.  In her author’s note at the beginning of the book Mian Mian 
says, “This book represents some of the tears I couldn’t cry, some of the 
terror behind my smiling eyes.  This book exists because one morning as the 
sun was coming up I told myself that I had to swallow up all of the fear and 
garbage around me, and once it was inside me I had to transform it all into 
candy.  Because I know you will be able to love me for it.”24  The people with 
whom Hong associates, the situations in which she finds herself, and the 
decisions she makes along the way illustrate the life of a young woman who 
lives in the moment and lives to excess.  Perhaps through the words of her 
character Hong we may also see into the heart of the author herself as we 
consider these excerpts from Candy: 
The next thing I knew, I’d been cut by Bailian’s knife.  I 
didn’t see where he’d taken it from, I didn’t see the blade 
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coming at me, and I didn’t see his hand returning it to wherever 
he kept it.  All I remember seeing was him standing in front of 
me holding the knife, ashen faced, looking as if he’d pulled a 
muscle.  The really interesting thing was that he wasn’t even 
looking at me.  He was staring out the window. 
When he cut me, I went cold all over, and through the 
pain I was struck for an instant by the sensation that my body 
was separating from itself, and my spirits soared.  Wave after 
wave of numbness hit me, spreading across my back, my mind 
went blank, and uncontrollable tears poured from my eyes.  I 
started shaking, and I felt the same way I did when I read 
certain poems, or sang certain songs, or heard particular stories; 
but it was even more intense and came on more quickly. 
Bailian was asking me, “Are you coming?” 
He still wasn’t looking at me. 
“Where?” I said. 
“Dancing.” 
“OK,” I said, “Sure.  But first let me go to the bathroom 
and wipe this blood off my arm.” 
I came back and stood in front of him, and when he 
raised his head to look at me, the knife in my hand went straight 
into his gut.  After the blade went in, I didn’t pull it out.  My father 
had given me this knife.  It was from Xinjiang.  I don’t know why 
my father had given it to me; it seemed just as strange to me as 
when he agreed to let me quit school.  After all, he was an 
“intellectual.” 
Bailian stood in front of me without moving.  We both just 
stood there, looking at each other.  His expression puzzled me, 
but before that feeling could sink in, I realized that I could barely 
stand.  Everything became silent and still, and I broke out in a 
sweat and felt myself drifting, drifting away. 
The authorities showed up.  Two knives, two people 
bleeding.  I didn’t know who had called the police, but they 
locked me up.25 
 
Hong, like Yu Dafu and the characters envisioned by the Republican era 
decadent writers, feels lonely and alienated from the rest of the world.  She is 
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uninterested in the lives of other people, is wholly self-absorbed, and leads a 
hedonistic existence.  She sheds some light on her inner life and that of her 
on-again off-again boyfriend, Saining, telling us about their fears, their dreams, 
and their modus operandi for living in Shenzhen: 
Saining and I had a lot in common.  For one thing, we 
each had our own worlds, our own mute worlds, and because of 
this, we respected each other’s silences.  We weren’t interested 
in other people’s lives, we were sensitive and self-doubting, we 
didn’t believe what we read in the newspaper, we were afraid of 
failure, and yet the thought of resisting some temptation made 
us anxious.  We wanted to be onstage, to be artists.  We kept 
on spending other people’s money, dreading the day when all of 
this would change.  We didn’t want to become good little 
members of society, nor did we know how.  Anyway, we would 
tell ourselves, we’re still young.26 
 
Hong vividly depicts just how the spiral into heroin began for Saining 
and eventually for herself.  Her gateway drug was alcohol.  She sinks into 
alcoholism while waiting for her boyfriend Saining to complete a drug rehab 
program, finding that she cannot function without drinking.27  Despite his stint 
in rehab, Saining is unable to stay clean and continues to use heroin.  He 
begins to use even more than he did before, and Hong’s drinking continues to 
control her life.  In a desperate attempt at salvaging their life together they 
both make a commitment to free themselves from drugs and alcohol.  Having 
come out of the hypnotic haze of the alcohol, Hong is able to see her life and 
the problems she faces more clearly than ever: 
If he was using heroin, it was barely discernible, and I 
wasn’t drinking as much.  Too often, though, we were in a state 
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of lethargy, and for the first time I found myself thinking 
seriously about death.  I hoped that I would die naturally, in my 
sleep.  I felt that I’d been fortunate, I’d enjoyed my life, and I 
hadn’t really suffered very much.  But lately I’d started to worry 
about money, and my desire for Saining was met with rejection, 
and with my boyfriend acting this way, over time I too lost 
interest in sex.  Sometimes even bathing seemed like too much 
of an effort.  I might as well have been dead. 
Die in the prime of youth, and leave a beautiful corpse:  
what an intensely beautiful dream that was, but we couldn’t 
manage to pull it off.  We had neither energy nor passion nor 
love.  We had nothing to burn except time… I didn’t want to 
inflict myself on the world any longer.28 
 
Hong herself ends up desperate and in drug rehab in Shanghai after 
she gives into the pull of heroin.  She knows that heroin was going to kill her, 
but could not resist it.  As soon as she completed her first stint in rehab she 
flew back to the South and back to heroin.  She said that, “Heroin had 
become as natural to me as breathing.  What else was there for me to do 
except use smack?  I couldn’t be around normal people.  They would never 
be able to understand the emptiness of using heroin or the terror that comes 
from quitting it.  If I didn’t have heroin, it didn’t seem as if I could go on 
living.”29  Hong’s hopelessness and eventual helplessness led her to self-
destructive behavior, but not all decadent rebels self destruct.  Some of them 
actually agonize over wanting to find a way out of their plight.  
Rocker Cui Jian is another post Mao culture maker who represents a 
variation on the decadent rebel – the man who is morally directionless and 
not complacent with it.  He articulates his sense of purposelessness through 
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the driving rock beat of many of his songs.  The moral vacuum that he 
perceives in his own life and in the life of his countrymen gives way to this 
lack of purpose, so much so that even while opportunities abound in today’s 
China (that previously had never been available), people are not sure which 
way to turn.  Just two years before the release of the album “Balls Under the 
Red Flag” Cui Jian released another song from his album, “Resolution,” 
entitled “Let Me Go Wild in the Snow.”  In it he sings of the complete and total 
numbness he feels (and believes the Chinese people feel), and the need for 
something to awaken his senses and his mind: 
Stripped to the waist 
I greet the blustering snow 
Running down the road from the hospital I escaped 
Don’t stop me 
I don’t want any clothes either 
Because my sickness is that I have no feeling. 
 
Give me a bit of flesh 
Give me a bit of blood 
Take away my grit and resolve 
Please let me cry 
Please let me laugh 
Please let me go wild on this snowy ground. 
 
Yi Yeh Yi Yeh 
Because my sickness is that I have no feeling 
Yi Yeh Yi Yeh 
Please let me go wild on this snowy ground. 
 
I wear no clothes or shoes 
Yet I cannot feel the force and intensity of the northwest wind 
I don’t know if I’m walking or running 
Because my sickness is that I have no feeling. 
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Give me a little stimulation – oh doctor my lord! 
Give me a little love – oh nurse my goddess! 
Please let me cry or please let me laugh 
Please let me go wild on this snowy ground. 
 
Yi Yeh Yi Yeh 
Because my sickness is that I have no feeling 
Yi Yeh Yi Yeh 
Please let me go wild on this snowy ground.30 
 
“Let Me Go Wild in the Snow” is not about momentary numbness, or 
numbness simply in response to a personal loss.  Cui Jian calls it a sickness.  
He does not see it as something that could be changed overnight, but as 
something that needs to be cured, for him and for his fellow Chinese. 
Despite the fact that almost seventy years separate the writings of Yu 
Dafu from Mian Mian and Cui Jian, and despite the fact that Yu is an 
educated literatus, Mian Mian is a high school dropout, and Cui Jian a rock 
star, the lives and works of all three are filled with the pursuit of pleasure, the 
preoccupation with death, or a sense of helpless wandering.  One would think 
that such subjects would alienate readers, but it is that very subject, alienation, 
and the fact that all three explore it with such honesty and depth, that have 
made these two authors and the rock star wildly popular among their 
respective generations. 
Another identity type that closely mirrors that of the decadent social 
rebel is the cultural celebrity – one who is notorious as for his or her personal 
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lifestyle as much as for his or her art.  During the Republican era, more and 
more authors were able to make literature a commercially feasible vocation.  
The salacious “gossip literature” written by friends of these authors made 
them celebrities.  Mu Shiying was one such celebrity author.  As one of the 
writers of the decadent school, he became known as an inveterate and 
“degenerate” urbanite, criticized for his lack of morals and the blatant way in 
which he flaunted his unconventional ideals through his writing and through 
his own life.  He spent inordinate amounts of time cruising the dance halls 
and cabaret of Shanghai, had a prodigious appetite for women and alcohol, 
and was described as being foppish to the point of distraction.  Opinions 
about him were as divergent as they were numerous.  Qu Qiubai, as a 
representative of the League of Left-Wing Writers, is quoted as saying, “Mu 
Shiying represents the perversion of the May Fourth intellectual ethic; he is a 
problem local to Shanghai’s capitalist environment, but dangerous in his 
ability to persuade Chinese readers throughout the nation to search for 
nothing nobler in life than material gratification.” He was assassinated at the 
age of twenty-eight, and like public opinion about him, his assassination is 
attributed to any number of reasons.  Some claim that he was murdered by 
the Nationalist Party for being a traitor, while others purport that he was 
working as a double agent for the Nationalists and was mistakenly killed by 
them. 31 
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While the example of post Mao cultural celebrity I offer here has not 
been the victim of a mysterious political plot, she has generated plenty of pop 
culture buzz all on her own.  Back in 2003 a twenty-five year old sex 
columnist became an Internet celebrity when she posted an explicit online 
account of her tryst with a Chinese rock star.  Her Internet site, Sina.com, 
began attracting over ten million visitors a day, and her name was the one 
most often typed into Sohu.com’s internet search engine.  The only other 
name that came close to hers in frequency was Ma Zedong.32  Her name is 
Mu Zimei.  “I think my private life is very interesting,” she says while arching 
an eyebrow and tapping a Marlboro Light into an ashtray.33  She estimates 
she has slept with approximately seventy men, and she’s still counting.  She 
also reveals that she had no idea her online diary would draw so much notice, 
or that it would spark a national controversy.  What she does do, however, is 
defend her right to sleep with as many men as she pleases – and to write 
about it.  “If a man does this, she said, “it’s no big deal.  But as a woman 
doing so, I draw lots of criticism.”34  Mu Zimei is the pen name of Li Li, who 
began working in 2001 as a feature writer at City Pictorial, a glossy magazine 
covering fashion and social trends.  At the end of 2002 editors overhauled the 
magazine and decided they wanted a sex columnist who could write about 
“real life” issues.  Mu said she was chosen because editors knew she was 
familiar with the subject.  Her first sexual experience – on April 30, 1999, she 
noted – ended with an abortion and left her wary of the opposite sex.  She 
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followed that with a “pretty normal boyfriend” before concluding she was not a 
one-man woman.  “Personally, I felt I was suitable for temporary 
relationships,” she said.35  Her biweekly column in City Pictorial began in 
January.  Her topics included recommendations on the best music for good 
lovemaking, the aphrodisiacal benefits of eating oysters and technical 
pointers on making love in a car.  It was racy stuff for China, but hardly 
without precedent.  What changed everything was her decision in April to start 
her own online blog at a new Chinese site for personal diaries.  She thought it 
would be fun.  While writing her magazine column, she had hopped from man 
to man, sometimes hopping to two men at once, sometimes hopping to 
married men.  The topics she wrote about in her magazine column, though, 
remained more thematic than explicit.  But in her online diary, she began 
writing explicitly about these encounters, or those of her friends, and on July 
26 described her brief and apparently unsatisfying liaison outside a restaurant 
with a famous guitarist in a Guangzhou rock band.36  In an effort to defuse the 
media frenzy, Mu quit her columnist job in early November and voluntarily 
shut down her website.  She said she had other offers and hoped to continue 
writing, assuming the Government did not ban her writing altogether.  She 
also said the attention had cramped her social life:  she has been celibate for 
two weeks (at the time of the article’s interview with her).37 
Another cultural celebrity of the post Mao era is twenty-six-year-old 
“heartthrob novelist,” Han Han, who hit the literary scene as an eighteen-year-
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old high school drop-out in 2000.  He is wildly popular, considered a celebrity 
heartthrob who fills the teen girl fantasies of his largest fan base.  He also has 
the number one rated blog on China’s largest blog hosting site (Sina.com), is 
a professional racecar driver, and now he has been labeled as China’s most 
popular “post-80s” author.  He has written predominantly about life as a 
teenager in urban China, and it appears that his writing resonates with most 
of young China.  However, he has been heavily criticized, even by his fans, 
for urging his fellow Chinese to “cool down” the flames of ultra-nationalism 
that have flared in the wake of post 9/11 global tensions.  Han’s urgings to 
“cool down” came after a nationwide call for a boycott of French supermarket 
chain, Carrefour, because one of its shareholders was a supporter of the 
Dalai Lama.  In a question and answer session with Sina.com this statement 
was made by the interviewer, “We firmly boycott Carrefour but you tolerate 
the foreign power’s insults against our great nation. If everyone was as weak 
as you, our country would have already been extinguished,” to which Han 
Han replied, “You are valiant, brave, unafraid of death and a martyr…because 
you don’t shop at a supermarket.”  Comments such as these fuel the criticism 
that follows him in the press, but it also fuels his celebrity.  Part of the reason 
he is so famous is because he has simply been audacious enough to say 
what he thinks.  Consider this statement made to Han later in the same 
interview, “During this divisive time you pretend to be clear-headed and speak 
calmly as a gentleman and patriot, yet speak out against public opinion.  If 
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words such as yours are able to be published, apparently China is far too free. 
You should be banned.”  A little incredulously Han replied, “Our people are on 
the one hand unleashing their political opinions, and on the other wishing the 
country be closed off? Our country is in the midst of progress and you force 
its degeneration. Be careful of what comes back around. Harm another and 
you harm yourself.”  When told that many people think he is rebellious, he 
downplays his independence by saying “Actually, I’m not at all.  I’m just doing 
what I like, and people happen to think of these things as rebellion.  I’m not 
really rebellious.”38 
Probably the best-known and most influential Chinese cultural celebrity 
from post Mao era pop culture is author Wang Shuo.  His prolific body of work 
from the 1980s paved the way for opportunities to write for television and film, 
often adapting his own novels to the small and large screens.  He is the father 
of the “hoodlum” genre of literature (pizi wenxue), populated by characters 
who live on the fringe of society and who make their way through life on their 
own terms.  The state labeled Wang Shuo and his circle of friends (who oddly 
resemble many of his novel’s characters) as “socially idle people” (shehui 
xiansan renyuan).  A journalist who interviewed Wang Shuo in the 1990s 
observed that: 
Wang Shuo is lucky to be a member of the least 
restricted social group [in China]:  the financially independent 
unemployed.  They are not what is usually understood by the 
term entrepreneur; they have no grand ambitions as far as work 
or lifestyle goes; financially well-off, they can’t be induced by 
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material benefits or hurt by their withdrawal.  In relative terms, 
their souls are un-tormented, and although they are careful not 
to break the law, they can do just about whatever they want.39 
 
By that description, Han Han has, in terms of his official status with the state, 
followed in the steps of Wang Shuo.  Both are independent from the need for 
state sponsorship of their work and both at least give the illusion of being able 
to do whatever they want, since money is not a major concern. 
If Wang Shuo and Han Han lived during the Republican era they would 
be considered members of the literati by virtue of the fact that they are 
published authors many times over and are both celebrities.  The wen ren or 
“man of letters” is yet another identity type found in the popular cultures of 
both eras.  By this description of what qualifies one as a “man of letters,” from 
a 1920s book on the subject, Mu Shiying, Wang Shuo, and Han Han would all 
qualify.  The initial qualification is that one be able to read and write a few 
words, “possess the conviction of his own genius, idiosyncrasy, physical 
beauty, experience in love, brazenness and flexibility against attack,” among 
other things.  As far as temperament, the modern wen ren is a boastful man, 
more emotional than rational, amorous, and bohemian.  He should have 
gourmet tastes, wear modern and fashionable clothes, and spend copious 
amounts of time and money cultivating several personal vices, some of which 
should be drinking, smoking, gambling, and womanizing.  He should publish 
in order to make himself famous, and should write about his own life and 
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romances.  Most importantly, he should not be afraid to take every 
opportunity to promote himself and his work.40 
 Wang Shuo and Han Han personify real post Mao era wen ren.  The 
literary embodiment of that identity is Jia Pingwa’s protagonist, Zhuang Zhidie, 
in his book The Abandoned Capital (1993), mentioned in the previous chapter.  
Zhuang is a successful author who spends his time indulging his voracious 
sexual appetite by seducing as many women as he has time to bed.  He 
drinks generous amounts of alcohol, and eventually loses his wife to divorce 
and loses his reputation as a serious writer to scandal.41  Though not all 
cultural celebrities are literary men, it seems that both eras celebrated such 
men on the page and in the news, giving those who enjoyed such celebrity a 
platform from which to garner more readers and spread their brand of art. 
A final fashionable identity type from the popular culture of both eras is 
the tragic hero or heroine – the likeable character whose fate is a miserable 
one that he believes is inevitable and cannot be altered due to circumstances 
beyond his control.  During the Republican era the idea of the tubercular 
scholar leaps most readily to mind, however, some of the most notable tragic 
figures were women, like Ding Ling’s Miss Sophie.  The tragic circumstances 
of the servant girl, Ming-feng, in Ba Jin’s famous book, Family (1931), are a 
prime example of a young woman who is a pawn in the dealings of the family 
which she serves.  Although Chueh-hui, one of the young masters of the 
family, has pledged his love to her, she has little hope that he will be able to 
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influence his family’s decision to send her to become the concubine of an 
elderly man of their acquaintance: 
Ming-feng’s fate was irrevocably decided.  But she 
couldn’t give up the last shred of hope.  She was fooling herself, 
really, for she knew there wasn’t the slightest hope, and never 
could be. 
She waited to see Chueh-hui that day with trembling 
heart.  He came home after nine in the evening.  She walked to 
his window.  Hearing the voice of his brother, she hesitated, 
afraid to go in but unwilling to leave.  If she gave up this last 
opportunity, whether she lived or died, she would never be able 
to see him again. 
 “Third Young Master,” she called gently. 
“Ming-feng, it’s you?”  Chueh-hui raised his head in 
surprise.  He smiled at her.  “What is it?” 
“I have to speak to you.”  Her melancholy eyes avidly 
scanned his smiling face.  Before she could go on, he 
interrupted. 
“Is it because I haven’t talked with you these last few 
days?  You think I’ve been ignoring you?”  He laughed tenderly.  
“No, you mustn’t think that.  You see how busy I am.  I have to 
study and write, and I’ve other things to do too.”  Chueh-hui 
pointed at a pile of manuscripts and magazines.  “I’m as busy as 
an ant.  It will be better in a day or two.  I’ll have finished this 
work by then.  I promise you.  Only two more days.” 
“Two more days?” Ming-feng cried, disappointed.  As if 
she hadn’t understood, she asked again, “Two more days?” 
That’s right,” said Chueh-hui with a smile.  “In two more 
days I’ll be finished.  Then we can talk.  There’s so much I want 
to tell you.”  He again bent over his writing. 
“Third Young Master, don’t you have any time now, even 
a little?”  Ming-feng held back her tears with an effort. 
“Can’t you see I’m busy?” said Chueh-hui roughly, as if 
reproving her for persisting.  But when he observed her stricken 
expression and the tears in her eyes, he immediately softened.  
Taking her hand he stood up and asked soothingly, “Has 
someone been picking on you?  Don’t feel badly.” 
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He really wanted to put aside his work and take her into 
the garden and comfort her.  “Be patient,” he pleaded.  “In 
another two days we’ll have a long talk.  I definitely will help you.  
I love you as much as ever.  But please go now and let me 
finish my work.  You’d better hurry.  Second Young Master will 
be back in a minute.” 
Chueh-hui looked around to make sure that they were 
alone, then took her face in his hands and lightly kissed her lips.  
Smiling, he indicated with a gesture that she should leave 
quickly.  He resumed his position at the desk, pen in hand, but 
his heart was pounding.  It was the first time he had ever kissed 
her. 
…Ming-feng seemed to awake from a dream and her 
expression changed.  Her lips trembled, but she did not speak.  
She gazed at him longingly with the utmost tenderness, and her 
eyes suddenly shone with tears.  “Third Young Master,” she 
cried in an anguished voice. 
Chueh-min came into the room.  The first words out of his 
mouth were, “Wasn’t that Ming-feng who just left here?”  
“Yes.”  Chueh-hui continued writing.  He did not look at 
his brother. 
“That girl isn’t the least bit like an ordinary bondmaid.  
She’s intelligent, pure, pretty – she can even read a little.  It’s a 
shame that Yeh-yeh is giving her to that old reprobate for a 
concubine.  It’s a real shame!” sighed Chueh-min. 
“What did you say?”  Chueh-hui put down his pen.  He 
was shocked. 
“Don’t you know?  Ming-feng is getting married.” 
“She’s getting married?  Who said so?  She’s too young!” 
“Yeh-yeh is giving her to that shameless old scoundrel 
Feng to be his concubine…. The wedding day is tomorrow.  I 
certainly am sorry for Ming-feng.  She’s only seventeen.” 
“Tomorrow!”  “Marry!”  “Concubine!”  “Old Feng!”  The 
words lashed against Chueh-hui’s brain till he thought it would 
shatter.  He rushed out; he thought he heard a mournful wail…  
Suddenly a torturing realization dawned upon him.  She had 
come to him just now in the utmost anguish, to beg for his 
help…  And what had he done?  Absolutely nothing.42 
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Chueh-hui goes to search for Ming-feng but cannot find her.  She had 
drowned herself in the lake in the garden, crying his name as she plunged to 
her death.  The real tragedy of her situation is that she was unable to 
recognize her own worth and therefore did not want to be too troublesome to 
Chueh-hui by seeking him out again.  In reality if Ming-feng would take the 
risk to “bother” Chueh-hui by telling him about her dilemma and asking for his 
help she would have found that he wanted to help her whether or not he was 
able to. 
One equivalent that features prominently in post Mao era literature is 
not the tubercular scholar, but rather the drug-addicted artist.  In Shanghai 
Baby, Coco’s boyfriend, Tian Tian, is a depressed artist who is sexually 
impotent and a heroin addict.  In the end he comes to see himself as a 
burden to his girlfriend and the other people he loves.  Strung out on heroin, 
he overdoses and dies in his sleep.  Coco is left to ponder whether his 
overdose is accidental or intentional.  The following excerpt from Shanghai 
Baby speaks of the last night of Tian Tian’s life:  
I listened to the music as Tian Tian slipped into the toilet 
and, after a long while, wobbled out. 
I knew what he was doing, but I could never deal with it 
head-on, deal with his dulled, vacuous expression, as if his soul 
had flown far far away.  Afterward, I got drunk.  His drug high 
required a matching alcoholic high on my part, and with each of 
us inside our own high, we resisted our egos, ignored our pain, 
and jumped about like rays of light.   
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Having danced inside the music and soared inside our 
own euphoria, at one in the morning we returned to our 
apartment.  We didn’t wash, just threw off our clothes and lay 
down on the bed.  The air conditioning was on full blast, and 
even in my dreams I could hear its buzz, like an insect’s cry.  My 
dreams were empty except for that one troubling sound. 
Early the next morning, as soon as the first ray of sunlight 
showed, I opened my eyes and turned to kiss Tian Tian.  My hot, 
hot kiss was imprinted on his cold, cold body, which was 
glowing white.  I shook him hard, called him, kissed him, and 
pulled his hair.  Then, I jumped out of bed naked and ran onto 
the balcony.  Through the glass I stared at the bed inside the 
room, at my lover’s body lying there.  I stared for a long, long 
time.  Tears flooded my face, and I bit my fingertips.  I cried out:  
“You fool!”  He didn’t react.  He was dead and so was I.43 
 
The tragedy of Tian Tian is repeated over and over through the works of Mian 
Mian,  Jia Pingwa, Wang Shuo, and countless other culture makers of the 
post Mao era.  It seems that the opportunities afforded urban Chinese in this 
era also afforded more means of rendering its pop culture characters tragic.  
These tragic characters, whether male or female, educated or not, found 
sympathetic readers in their respective eras.  Although they are not always 
the protagonists of their stories, they are hard to forget. 
 The identity types presented in this chapter represent some of the 
most vivid ones celebrated in the popular culture of the Republican and post 
Mao eras.  The femme fatale, the playgirl,  the decadent social rebel, the anti 
hero, the cultural celebrity, and the tragic hero or heroine all appear frequently 
in the pop culture works of both eras.  It is ironic that in the midst of 
celebrating individuality and plurality pop culture makers from both eras 
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inadvertently (or maybe intentionally) reinforce the notion of conformity.  In 
celebrating their individuality, pop culture makers force the characters they 
create into an identifiable group or demographic.  Maybe the journey from 
being part of a conformist collective, through the celebration of one’s unique 
individuality leads to a place where one understands what she values and 
desires, and as a result, is better-equipped to connect with others of similar 
values and desires.  Perhaps plurality and individuality lead to even more 
meaningful community based on real commonalities and not simply 
ideological ones. 
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Conclusion 
Pop Culture Déjà vu Revisited 
 
 
The emergence and development of the spontaneous urban popular 
culture that is alive and thriving in today’s China is not the first of its kind in 
modern Chinese history.  This thesis examined three significant ways in 
which the urban popular culture of post Mao China parallels that of the 
Republican era.  The sociopolitical conditions present in both eras that made 
China ripe for the emergence of spontaneous urban pop culture are strikingly 
similar.  The specific circumstances are not identical.  Indeed, Republican era 
China was emerging from a very long period of imperial rule and semi-
isolation; post Mao era China was emerging from the strict confines of the 
Maoist era.  Republican era society was shifting away from the moral 
authority and social control of Confucianism; post Mao society was shifting 
away from the moral authority and social control of the Chinese Communist 
Party.  Technological advances of the Republican era included such 
innovations as the mechanized printing press, the radio, photography, and 
moving films; technological advances of the post Mao era included the 
Internet, cell phones, satellite television, and personal computers.  The rapid 
economic growth of both periods has been different in scale and the type and 
amount of foreign influences of both periods are not identical.  Surprisingly, 
though, the identity messages on individualism and cosmopolitanism, as well 
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as the identity types most often celebrated through the urban pop culture of 
both eras are amazingly similar. 
Although these two periods of Chinese history are separated by over 
thirty intervening years of the Maoist era, it is important to note that if the 
dates and the authors of the cultural works examined here were not known to 
the reader, some of the examples cited from the post Mao era in these 
chapters would be difficult to distinguish from similar examples from the 
Republican era.  The pop culture of both eras promotes similar identity 
messages about individuality – that individuality is important and worthy of 
expression, that it is permissible and potentially beneficial to bring private 
issues into the public sphere, that change and experimentation are inevitable, 
and that through embracing the spirit of these messages one can contribute 
to building a more pluralistic society.  As for identity messages regarding 
cosmopolitanism, again, the pop culture of both eras promote similar 
messages – that it is important to think of oneself as a global citizen, that part 
of being a global citizen involves enlarging the context in which one lives 
one’s life, that social mores and attitudes are constantly changing, and that 
part of the responsibility of being a global citizen involves learning to tolerate 
several points of view other than your own and celebrating differences.  
Through exploring one’s own unique identity in the context of urban popular 
culture one may actually find a more meaningful community or collective body 
of other people with which one identifies; Chinese urban popular culture from 
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both eras provides multiple venues for exploring the attitudes, experiences, 
and the very individuality of oneself and other people, both real and fictional.  
Through its messages it sends out into society multiple points of possible 
connection and possible contention, which in some part fuel the continuation 
of pop culture creation. 
At the time I realized that some aspects of post Mao Chinese culture 
and society reminded me of what I imagined Republican era Chinese culture 
and society to be I had no idea how much that original thought would 
influence my area of study.  I also had no idea just how much the urban pop 
culture of both eras would capture my imagination and fuel my curiosity.  
Spontaneous urban pop culture in the Republican era China was curtailed by 
the onset of the Maoist era.  Having already witnessed the first thirty years of 
post Mao era urban pop culture, I am curious to see what direction it will take 
and how China will be changed because of it. 
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